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Abstract
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are ubiquitous in international negotiations on climate
change governance, participating in framing issues, providing information and expertise, and
lobbying government delegates. NGOs are said to supplement the democratic legitimacy and
technical capabilities of intergovernmental organizations, yet their actual political influence is
more difficult to empirically ascertain. This paper will use a qualitative framework to determine
the influence of NGOs in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), focusing on a case study of Indian NGOs. Using data collected at two UN
conferences, including interviews with NGO and government representatives and participant
observations, the influence of Indian NGOs will be explored, both in Indian policy and the wider
international context.
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Introduction
To address the issue of global climate change, the United Nations (UN) gathers yearly
under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), to determine
global governance on the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and the adaptation to the
effects of climate change. State parties, as the official delegations, negotiate international
agreements and actions, but at these meetings, known as the Conference of Parties (COP), state
representatives are not the only actors in the room. Instead, one finds a great multitude of
nonstate actors that operate independently of governments and have aims to influence the
decisions adopted by states.
These actors, referred to as nongovernmental associations (NGOs), come in many forms
and have been officially included in international governance since the formation of the UN, but
over time adopted a more prominent position in global governance. Much scholarship focuses on
the rise in participation by NGOs (Betsill and Corell 2001; 2008; Arts 2005; Newell; and others),
but casual observations of NGO presence in the UNFCCC does not address the issue of the
substantive influence of these organizations. To determine influence, one must triangulate
indicators of influence through a precise methodological framework. Rarely can we clearly see a
direct line between NGO activity and government policy, rather the relationship is much more
complex and makes drawing broad conclusions difficult. It is necessary therefore, to direct our
scope to limited cases and actors.
In this paper will investigate the role of NGOs and the possibility of their influence in the
UNFCCC through cases of Indian NGOs. India plays a crucial role in the UNFCCC as a
developing country with increasing greenhouse gas emissions, a growing population emerging
from poverty, and high vulnerability to climate change, but also has a unique relationship with
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NGOs due to their position as a developing country and governing structures. I was fortunate
enough to have the opportunity to study in India and conduct research on these NGOs, in
addition participation in the UNFCCC, so a study of Indian NGOs was both circumstantial and
of scholarly interest.
I will outline the history and theoretical understandings of NGOs in international
governance and the United Nations so to contextualize this specific discussion of Indian NGOs.
Then, through surveys and interviews with organizational representatives and an analysis of
NGO documents, I will describe the policy goals and objectives of the organizations; and
through participant observations at COP21 in 2015 and COP22 in 2016, I will document each
organization’s activities in the COP. Finally, I will discuss and compare the activities of these
Indian NGOs in relation to the UNFCCC and the Indian government, ultimately concluding their
role and influence in international climate politics.

History of NGOs in the United Nations
A review of the history of the United Nations reveals the participation of NGOs in
various forms. A broad history of international action on environmental issues can also serve to
contextualize NGO participation in the more specific context of the UNFCCC. A number of
major moments in the history of environmental governance must be noted for their significance
in management of the environment and for the participation of NGOs: the 1972 Conference for
the Human Environment in Stockholm, Sweden, the 1992 “Earth Summit” in Rio de Janeiro, and
recent Conference of the Parties (COPs) under the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC).
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The United Nations has attempted to formalize and define NGO participation with
various rules of access codified in major U.N. documents. The evolution of these rules and
procedures characterize the increasing sophistication of NGO participation and the institutional
acceptance of their presence in international politics. Nongovernmental organization (NGOs)
have been present in the United Nations system since its conception in 1945. Article 71 of the
Charter of the United Nations states:
“The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for
consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with
matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international
organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation
with the Member of the United Nations concerned” (United Nations, 1945).
The U.N. recognizes NGOs as all voluntary associations of interest groups and individuals
without sponsorship by state governments, a so-called “Third United Nations” after the
representation of member states and international civil servants (Weiss, Carayannis, and Jolly
2009). In 1975, the U.N. established the NGO Liaison Service to facilitate civil society
participation within the international body.

Stockholm, 1972
The United Nations Conference for the Human Environment, held in Stockholm, Sweden
in 1972, was one of the first major conferences to discuss developmental and environmental
policy and a watershed moment for NGO participation in global politics. Stockholm concluded a
number of treaties related to environmental issues, but the true progress lay in the development
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of questions that underlie the debates to come. Here, the need for development collided with
concerns for environmental sustainability.
Framed by Garret Harden’s “tragedy of the commons” and concern for the impacts of
population growth (exemplified in the work by the Club of Rome), these debates sorted states
into the developed northern nations and developing southern nations (Conca et. al. 1998). The
global south viewed norther, industrial nations calling for a limitation to growth as method for
restraining the Souths’ ability to follow a similar path to development (Meadows et. al. 1998).
Environmental protection was therefore characterized as a Northern dominated ploy to continue
to suppress the South.
Over 400 NGOs participated in the UN Conference by lobbying governments to set
ambitious principles and goals for the governance of environmental resources and for the
protection of human rights (Arts 1998). These organizations framed issues of environmental
harm as vital to the survival of the human species and some, termed the “Neo-Malthusians,”
called for population control as a way to address both poverty and environmental issues. These
groups emphasized a more northern perspective, sponsoring birth control in developing countries
for instance, and were highly criticized by actors in the global south.
While the Conference in 1972 proceeds the climate change issue, it prompted the
establishment of the UN Environment Program (UNEP) and set a precedent for the inclusion of
civil society in discussions of international environmental governance. The declarations
ultimately signed by states in Stockholm articulates the needs to protect human development
needs while balancing protection of the environment, balancing in principle the needs and
priorities of both developing and developed countries, but the discussions that raged around the
Summit indicate the importance of civil society organizations in framing issues for public debate.
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Earth Summit, 1992
In 1992, following the emergence of the first research on global climate change and the
effects of greenhouse gases on global temperature, the United Nations convened the Conference
on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, commonly referred to as the “Earth
Summit.” Multiple decisions came out of this gathering of nation states and observers
organizations, including Agenda 21, the Convention on Biological Diversity,1 the Convention to
Combat Desertification, and the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
All of these environmental programs had some form of NGO participation, especially the
UNFCCC and the Convention to Combat Desertification.
One nonbinding document resulting from that conference, known as “Agenda 21,”
outlines actions for sustainable development and labels NGOs as “partners for sustainable
development” (UNCED, 1992). Mentioning nongovernmental organizations in numerous times
in sections pertaining to nearly every area of sustainable development and at every stage of the
policy process (consultation, policy proposals, capacity building, and implementation), Agenda
21 affirms the role of NGOs within an international regime of sustainable development.
Because NGOs “possess well-established and diverse experience, expertise, and
capacity” (UNCED 1992, 27.3), Agenda 21 argues that state governments and international
bodies should seek to integrate NGOs into the policy process through dialogue and direct
participation. States were charged with consulting NGOs in policy development (UNCED 1992,

1

NGOs were very influential in the Convention to Combat Desertification because of the “homogenous interests” of
the NGOs participating in negotiations and the supportive environment of the meetings, which sought NGO input
(Corell 1999). This Convention, because of its more localized and less politicized nature, offered a better
environment for NGOs to make substantive contributions and to shape the overall outcomes of the negotiations
(Corell 2008).
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27.10.a.ii) and in the implementation of policy (UNCED 1992, 27.10.a.iii), while the United
Nations system was tasked with “enhancing” and streamlining NGO participation in U.N.
decision making and processes (UNCED 1992, 27.9). While this expansion of participation was
generally well received, some commentators worried that an unspecified or unprincipled
approach may undermine the intention of such measures (Albin 1999).
Alongside Agenda 21, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) outlined the principles and goals of a global regime to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions and limit global temperature rise. As a “Framework Convention,” the original text lays
the groundwork for future international climate change agreements to be determined during
yearly Conferences of the Parties (COPs) under the Convention. The mission of the UNFCCC is
to “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (UNFCCC 1992). Through
various mechanisms and international agreements, nation states attempted to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions and manage the adverse effects of climate change.
While the original text of the Convention introduced key concepts and principles, like the
“common but differentiated responsibility” principle which highlights the divide in culpability
and capability between developed and the developing world (UNFCCC 1992), it also set the
stage for future debates on the methods of acting on and implementing the Convention. The
generality and ambiguity of the Convention text forced a gradual solidification of substantive
commitments and action, a process described by Yamin and Depladge (2004, 75) as having
“evolved in tandem with the strengthening of procedural commitments.” These procedural
commitments involve the political process and negotiations that “catalyze” substantive action in
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future COPs, a sort of institutional incrementalism that delays the implementation of climate
action into the future.
The UNFCCC suffers the limitations of many international organizations however, which
are both extremely bureaucratic and technical, and which are subject to the conflicting
perspectives of the states who constitute them. The UNFCCC is an example of a “two-level
game,” where international policy is derived from the domestic, state level (Putnam 1988). While
the bureaucratic civil servants of the Secretariat of the UNFCCC may work to find common
solutions to climate change, they are constrained by the preferences and intransigence of states.
The UNFCCC acts as a “facilitative” body that negotiates compromise between various state
perspectives. This conundrum also has implications for civil society participation: civil society
actors must seek influence not only in international spheres of the UNFCCC, but also at the state
level to influence the positions of individual states who compose the IO itself.
Within the original negotiation of the UNFCCC, Arts (1998) argues that NGOs were not
influential in the outcome and substance of the Convention, but Newell (2000, 147) says that
governments did note NGO participation in the Rio Summit, especially in their activities to
create “a public expectation that a convention would be ready for signature at Rio in June 1992”
(Arts 1998, 147). Arts’ analysis focused upon the “subjective” perceptions of different actors
involved in the conferences and their expectations of influence, which are more liable to an
overestimation of influence than the “objective” indicators of influence present or absent from
the negotiated treaties. Newell takes a more qualified, pragmatic approach and focuses his
analysis upon the agenda-setting role of NGOs and their ability to frame public and government
opinion. The public awareness of the Rio Summit had not been seen the conference in Stockholm
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in 1972, thus raising the perception of importance of the outcomes concluded in Rio and the
likelihood of substantive agreements (Newell 2000).

Accreditation Process and the Conference of Parties
NGOs wishing to participate in the official COP space are required to formally apply for
accreditation by the UNFCCC Secretariat. The UNFCCC requires Parties to “seek and utilize,
where appropriate, the services and cooperation of, and information provided by, competent
international organizations and intergovernmental and non-governmental bodies” (UNFCCC
1992, Article 7). The Convention requires that observers be “qualified in matters covered by the
Convention, and which has informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented” may be
admitted, given that no more than one third of the Parties object (UNFCCC, Article 7, 6, 1992).
At the 2nd Conference of the Parties in 1996, member states adopted rules of procedure for
parties and observers under the Convention (UNFCCC 1996).
During the application process, each NGO is required to classify themselves into one of
nine “constituencies,” or clusters of interests recognized by the UNFCCC. These nine
constituencies are: (1) business NGOs, (2) environmental NGOs, (3) indigenous peoples, (4)
local governments and municipal authorities, (5) research institutions, (6) trade unions, (7)
women and gender organizations, (8) youth organizations, and (9) farmers (UNFCCC
“Constituencies and You”). The accreditation process and classification into constituency offers
the benefits of inclusion into the UN system (UNFCCC 2003). Constituencies are organized
under a central “focal point,” who facilitates information sharing and offers increased access to
negotiations and invitations to closed meetings (UNFCC, “Constituencies and You”). Accredited
NGOs have the opportunity to lobby governmental diplomats, make formal statements, introduce
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policy options, present at official side events, and share information about the activities of their
organizations within the accredited areas of the conference. These NGOs have access to the
“Blue Zone” at conferences, the official and secured spaces where government delegates gather
to negotiate, as opposed to the public “Green Zone,” which offers an important, but less
prominent area for public discussion of climate change issues.2
Within the Conference of Parties and the officially accredited Blue Zone, there are three
spaces in which NGOs and other observers gather: the plenary halls and meeting rooms, the civil
society pavilions, and the country pavilions. The plenary hall and meeting rooms are where
government delegates officially meet to discuss climate issues and negotiate. The plenary halls
are what we think of when envisioning the UN, a giant hall with 193 seats, where delegates make
illustrious speeches to the world community. However, most of the substance of meeting takes
place in small meeting rooms, each that hosts moderated discussions on the minutiae of an
agreement or topic. These meetings are often closed to the public and even to accredited
organizations, but the Secretariat does issue a certain number of passes to the constituencies that
allow them access to some closed-door meetings.3
The civil society space is offered to all accredited members of civil society and consists
of meeting rooms, presentation spaces, and booths for organizations to display their information.

2

In my own experience at the Conference of Parties, I received accreditation through a
delegation from St. John’s University, organized in the research institution nongovernmental
organization (RINGO) constituency. I had access to the Blue Zone and was able to participate in
official sessions of the COP. I experienced both the feeling of access, the ability to engage
directly with policymakers and leaders in the climate movement, but also the frustration of
being unable to “keep up” with all the activities in the COP. There is simply too much for a
single researcher, or NGO, to participate in, thus strategic and realistic ambitions are needed
3 I was able to represent the Research Institution NGO (RINGO) in a number of these meetings
and was tasked with recording notes on what was discussed and then reporting to the entire
constituency. In this process, access to information is crucial for organizations to stay up to date
with the most recent negotiating positions and is a constant challenge for small NGOs.
13

This space of the COP takes on the atmosphere of a trade show, as organizations distribute
information, advocate for their positions, and present on their work. Official Side Events,
organized by the constituencies and the Secretariat, are scheduled throughout the Conference,
bringing together organizations on topics across the spectrum of climate change issues. These
presentations offer organizations the opportunity to educate and advocate, and are occasionally
attended by government representatives.
Finally, the country pavilion space hosts individual nations as they demonstrate their
commitment to climate action. These spaces are elaborate displays of elements of a countries
heritage, tradition, and culture in relation to their plans to fight climate change and bring about a
cleaner world. Each country takes a different approach to design and attractions, but these spaces
are expensive investments that are supposed to express a country’s commitments. However, the
pomp of nations’ pavilions is often criticized and joked about by observers and representatives
alike. Some note the hypocrisy of the use of money and resources, with one individual saying
that the extravagance of a country’s pavilion is inversely proportional to their level of
commitment to true climate action, with the most wild and elaborate pavilions constructed by the
countries most resistant to climate commitments.4

Kyoto Protocol, 1997
To fulfill the aims of the Framework Convention, nations adopted the Kyoto Protocol at
COP 3 in 1997. Through a system of binding emissions reduction targets, member states were
committed to limit emissions to 1990s levels by the year 2000 (UNFCCC 1997). Through
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Interview with a delegate from the European Union. 11 November 2016. Marrakech,
Morocco.
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international mechanisms, including an emissions trading regime, the Clean Development
Mechanism, and a financing mechanism called the Global Environmental Facility, the
international community sought to compel Annex I states to meet their legal obligations.5
Developing countries, categorized as Annex II and including growing emitters India and China,
were not required to make legally binding emissions reductions.
However, and the Protocol failed to mobilize the necessary political will to meet its goals.
The Kyoto Protocol did not live up to the expectations of emissions reductions, both due to the
nonparticipation of the United States and the ill-conceived institutional framework (Rosen 2015).
The United States, a major polluter and key state, failed to ratify the accord and the
nonparticipation of developing countries like India and China, whose emissions rose at a great
rate, meant that no meaningful emissions reduction was achieved.
NGOs are noted to have been “prominent” throughout the process of negotiations of the
Kyoto Protocol. While their actual influence may not be evident by a review of the outcomes and
text of the Kyoto Protocol, Betsill (2008) argues that NGO presence did shape the process of
debate. Many of the more ambitious proposals submitted by NGOs were not included in the text
of the agreement, but Betsill contends that NGOs were instrumental in framing and setting issues
on the negotiation agenda. NGOs were instrumental in framing the north-south divide between
developing and developed nations, a conception that was institutionalized in the Kyoto
Protocol’s bifurcation between Annex I and Annex II countries.

Cardoso Report, 2002

5

The Kyoto Protocol divided states into classifications of “Annex I” and “Annex II,” with Annex I
countries held to binding emission reduction targets (UNFCCC 1997).
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In 2002, the General Assembly commissioned a review of the relations between
nongovernmental organizations and the United Nations. A Panel of Eminent Persons on United
Nations—Civil Society Relations, headed by former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique
Cardoso, created a report on the “best practices” of engaging civil society. This report, published
in 2004 and commonly referred to as the “Cardoso Report,” argues that further civil society
participation would improve the functionality of UN programs through NGO expertise, would
engage stakeholders and constituencies at all levels of policy, thus augmenting the democratic
legitimacy of the United Nations. While not specific to environmental governance, the report
widely circulated throughout the UN and it demonstrates the concerted efforts of the
organization to engage NGOs.
To justify enhancing dialogue and cooperation with civil society, the report states that
“an enhanced engagement could help the United Nations do a better job, further its global goals,
become more attuned and responsive to citizens’ concerns and enlist greater public support”
(United Nations, 2004). It argues for a dual approach, calling on the enhancement of engagement
on the country level as well as institutional support and access for civil society.
Many actors criticized the Cardoso Report: states, NGOs, U.N. bureaucrats, and
academic scholars all took issue with its recommendations. Some scholars describe the
formalization of constituencies and rules of access as a form of “neocorporatism,” an approach to
global governance that seeks to manage inclusion of pertinent “sectors” (Willetts 2006). This
approach recognizes the formal “modes of collaboration” between the United Nations and civil
society in a “multistakeholder dialogue” (Coate 2009). While some expound the efficiency of
such a collaboration, others warn of institutional control over independent organizations. Some
saw the functionalist approach as a “threat to the NGO participation rights,” arguing that the
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accreditation and inclusion of civil society based off of technical expertise run counter to the
democratic and pluralist norms also expressed in the report (Willetts 2006). “Functionalism,”
Willets argues, “aims to restrict participation to experts” (Willets 2006, 317), instead of being
truly representational of the global community. These commentators cited the increasingly
restrictive rules of access and the report’s confusion over terminology, as potentially causing
conflicts and inequities of opportunity within the UN (Martens and Paul, 2004; Anheier 2008;
Coate 2009).6

COP 15: Copenhagen, Denmark
Another major moment in the history of the UNFCCC came in 2009 at the 15th
Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen, Denmark. Prior to COP 15, there was the belief that a
new internationally binding agreement would replace the Kyoto Protocol after negotiations in
Copenhagen, an agreement that would definitively determine the future of climate governance.
However, the accords fell into disarray due to a lack of consensus amongst developed nations
and the developing world. The final political agreement called for nonbinding emissions
reductions to be determined individually by the Parties (UNFCCC 2009), rejecting the Kyoto
model of binding targets. The high expectations of many actors were largely left unfulfilled in
Copenhagen, but a some progress was made in terms of climate finance—with developed

6

Despite these criticisms over the best formulation of NGO and IGO collaboration and
engagement, civil society participation in international affairs is now an instituted fact in global
politics. The proliferation of NGOs across a range of political issues, stretching from the
developed to the developing world has even prompted some scholars to declare the advent of
an era of “global civil society” and a new mode of international governance (Keane 2003). While
these claims may exaggerate the potential legacy of NGO participation, in its most deliberate
and formulated moments within international organizations, the rules and procedures of the
United Nations illustrate the concerted effort to include civil society.
17

countries pledging to raise $100 billion a year for developing country mitigation and
adaptation—and agreeing to a long-term goal of limiting temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius
(UNFCCC 2009).
Civil society participation in COP 15 was massive, compared to relatively small, stable
levels of participation in prior negotiations. Observers outnumbered state-party representatives,
with over 20,000 registered participants came from civil society organizations, compared to the
roughly 8,000 representatives of the Parties (UNFCCC 2014). This increased participation was in
part due to the high profile of the negotiations and the expectation of a lasting deal, as well as the
European location (the home of many NGOs), but resulted in difficulty and resistance. Due to
increased registration and poor planning by the Danish administration, many NGOs were “shut
out” of crucial negotiations and forced to participate from the sidelines (Fisher 2010).
Additionally, the NGOs “merged” with more radical groups who called for “climate justice” and
anticapitalistic approaches. These outsider groups, like the advocacy NGO Earth First! used
tactics of protest and confrontation, threatened to “occupy” the negotiations, and in part argued
against the UNFCCC regime itself. These discourses of protest, as well as the increase in
political tension surrounding the second week of the Conference, caused a restriction of access to
the final, high-level negotiations, when leaders decided much of the substantive material
(Hadden 2014).

COP 21: Paris, France
From the failure in Copenhagen, states began to initiate a new approach to climate
governance, culminating in the 2015 Paris Agreement of COP 21, and the UN attempted to
reevaluate and mend its relations with NGOs. While attempts in Kyoto and Copenhagen were
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unsuccessful in securing binding and precise emission reduction commitments from developed
and developing countries, a new framework was proposed at COP 21 built upon voluntary
contributions to climate action.
The Paris Agreement, signed and entered into force in 2016, details a global temperature
goal that demands the voluntary emission reductions by member states, while outlining
additional institutional measures to adapt to climatic effects and finance efforts to meet
commitments under the agreement. Individual nations proposed “Nationally Determined
Contributions” (NDCs) that outline their individual contributions to the global collaboration on
climate change. These voluntary contributions represent a shift in character of the UNFCCC, a
shift from a “regulatory” role in climate governance (with legally binding targets) to a “catalytic
and facilitative” role in mobilizing action (Hale 2016). Some commentators argued that this new
approach “violated the spirit of the Convention,” while others point to measures in the
Agreement that gradually “increase ambition” and to fulfill the commitments of the Convention.
After early fears of a repeat of Copenhagen in regards to the participation of civil society,
the President of COP 21, Laurent Fabius, made a direct effort to engage members of civil
society, saying that NGOs “play a major role” in the negotiation process.7 Over 6,000 individuals
from over 1,000 distinct NGOs participated in COP 21 (Orr 2016).President Fabius appointed
the former head of COP 20, Manuel Pulgar-Vidal, as the “Special Envoy of the President to Civil
Society,” a liaison between the Secretariat and NGOs. Mr. Pulgar-Vidal held numerous meetings
with members of civil society, hoping to maintain a dialogue that would avoid any conflicts and
maintain good relations during the COP.

7

Laurent Fabius (President, Conference of the Parties 21), in a briefing to observer organizations. 2
December, 2015.
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Structured in traditional U.N. form, these meetings began with the President or the
Special Envoy giving a brief statement reiterating the principles and commitments of the COP
regarding the inclusion of NGOs and observers, followed by an open question-answer session.
Each constituency of observers was intended to designate a focal point representative, who
would pose questions to the administration on behalf of the group, but some constituencies failed
to appear at these meetings and others dominated discussion. In general, questions focused on the
continued role of observers within negotiations and complained of a lack of access, while some
advocated a policy position of their organization or attempted to glean some sort of information
out of the administration on the current state of negotiations8.
The Special Envoy was especially cordial in responding to questions and comments,
however did not supply organizations with answers of actual substance. He said that COP21 was
unprecedented in terms of NGO and civil society participation, but due to the tragic terrorist
attacks in Paris, some events were canceled for security reasons. He stressed that these events
must not prevent the expression of civil society participation and that he intended to keep “close
and personal contact” between civil society and the Presidency of the COP.
A key complaint that was reiterated throughout the week was the lack of access to
“spinoff” rooms where subsidiary bodies of the COP would discuss minute elements of the text.
While the administration allowed access through webcast to some of these meetings in “overflow
rooms,” other subsidiary meetings, termed “informal” or “informal informal” meetings, were
closed to all observers and not streamed through the internet. While questions repeatedly raised
this issue, the representatives of the COP administration responded by noting their commitment
to transparency and that they were acting “within the rules of the Convention.”

8

Author’s observations. 2 December 2015. Paris, France
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Despite these discussions and public statements by the Paris COP administration, many
commentators described the limiting and restrictive nature of COP 21. In his analysis of the Paris
Agreement and the overall negotiations, Dimitrov notes that the Paris Agreement was “made
possible by the heavy use of secrecy” (Dimitrov 2016, 5). While the Secretariat made some
concessions to civil society participants, the critical substance of negotiations remained decided
behind closed doors and amongst key actors alone (Hadden 2014). Even the shadow of the recent
terrorist attacks in Paris resulted in some closings of opportunities for NGOs to participate,
especially with regard to outsider NGO pressure and demonstration (Orr 2016). COP 21
demonstrated the “institutional control” over NGO participation, a shift to a model of
“collaboration” between the UNFCCC and NGOs (Orr 2016). COP 21 generally recognized
NGOs as “core elements” in the COP, and in turn, NGOs accepted the UNFCCC as the
legitimate governing body of international climate change (Hale 2016).

COP 22: Marrakesh, Morocco
The 22nd Conference of Parties (COP 22), held in Marrakesh, Morocco, was slated to the
“implementation COP” of the Paris Agreement. The main task was to interpret the language of
the Paris Agreement and to create the ‘rulebook’ for its implementation. Many commentators
noted the intentional ambiguity of the Paris Agreement, saying that it prolonged political conflict
without resolving fundamental differences (Geden 2016). In Marrakesh, as in Paris, the most
contentious issue areas of finance, information-sharing, and loss-and-damage were left
unresolved, with Parties unwilling to compromise or concede in their stances.
Civil society participated in record number during COP 22. Over 22,000 participants
from NGOs and IGOs were admitted to the Conference, surpassing even the previous numbers
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set in Paris (UNFCCC 2017). The Moroccan Presidency attempted to continue the work and
priorities of the previous French Secretariat by engaging civil society saying that “Civil society
played an essential role in the Paris Agreement” and that (COP 22, 2016). COP 22, while
limiting access to the negotiation rooms in many cases, did not receive the criticism from civil
society that was leveled against the organizers in Paris. Whereas this restriction and secrecy were
dominant narratives in Paris, civil society did not raise these concerns as prominently in
Marrakesh. (COP22 2016).
Civil society participation in COP 22 also took on a fundamental shift after Paris’
COP21. Paris garnered an unprecedented amount of attention and participation by civil society
because of the expected Paris Agreement, a last ditch effort by NGOs to influence the document
that would frame climate action into the future. Upon the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the
role of advocacy for many observers shifted from that of lobbying for moralistic and idealistic
frameworks to the support of implementation through information provision and research. While
protest and demonstration for increased ambition for climate action did take place (and in a few
cases protests against the governing regime of the UNFCCC), the general consensus amongst
observers within the accredited Blue Zone was the acceptance of the Paris Agreement as the new
reality for climate change governance for years to come. Some NGOs issued declarations, like
the Marrakech Call to Action from African Civil Society, which called for increased ambition
and climate justice, but ultimately do not actively reject the framework of the Paris Agreement
(Moroccan Coalition for Climate Justice 2016). The framework has been set, and NGOs and
other organizations sought to position themselves in the new era of the Paris Agreement.
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NGO Theory
NGO Definitions
“Civil society” is a broad term that can encompass a range of non-state actors, including
issue-focused groups, multinational corporations, religious groups, indigenous peoples, and even
terrorist organizations. Any non-state entity that participates within society and government
could fall under this broad umbrella term. However, the United Nations adopted this term using a
more structured definition, identifying certain parameters and institutionally recognized forms of
civil society representation (see discussion of U.N. Constituencies above). The UN avoids using
the term “NGO” because for some individuals the term holds a connotation of Northern
domination of global endeavors, with NGOs based in developed countries dictating policy goals
and projects within the global South.
However, particular definitions on what constitutes an NGO can itself be problematic.
Broad definitions, like Arts’ (1998) description of an NGO as “a promotional pressure group
which seeks to influence political decision-making on certain issues,” leave a great amount of
room for interpretation. Betsill and Corell (2008, 4) too use the term “NGO” to refer to “a broad
spectrum of actors from advocacy groups rooted in civil society to privately held multinational
corporations and trade associations to research-oriented bodies that participate in international
environmental negotiation processes using the tools of diplomacy.” These “tools of diplomacy,”
used by a variety of actors, distinguish NGOs from other social movements and protests groups
that do not engage within the formal institution of the UNFCCC and other internationally agreed
upon policy spaces. These broad definitions expand the scope of NGOs to such an extent that the
term “NGO” begins to lose any meaningful content and thus designate organizations that lack
any resemblance to one another.
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Oberthür et al. (2002) offer a framework for defining NGOs within the criteria of
international law, deriving their definition from a review of relevant literature on NGOs and
intergovernmental organization guidelines. They outline three conditions for qualifying as an
NGO under international law, articulating that NGOs must: 1) not be formed by
intergovernmental agreement, 2) have expertise or interest relevant to the international
institution, and 3) express views that are independent of any national government (Oberthür et al.
2002). This framework highlights the necessity for independence of NGOs from both states and
IGOs, but also recognizes that NGOs may work collaboratively with states while maintaining
their ability to speak freely and challenge state interests.
Because the landscape of affected stakeholders and interested parties is so diverse in the
international climate change and environmental arena, it is necessary to accept and utilize such a
broad measure in determining the definition of “NGO.” In a synthesis of these previously
proposed definitions, NGOs will be defined, for the purposes of this paper, as not-for-profit
actors voluntarily composed of individuals or representative groups independent of state or
international mandate, which engage in international environmental negotiations using
diplomatic advocacy and specialized knowledge.
NGOs can at times be synonymous with other terms used by scholars across many fields
of study. Terms like civil society organization, pressure group, advocacy coalition, epistemic
community, transnational environmental activist groups, transnational advocacy group, and
others share characteristics with NGOs, but have implications and connotations that are outside
the scope of this discussion. Each term is established by an accompanying framework to justify
and explain the influence of these concepts in a parlance unique to each scholar’s area of study. I
will use the more common term “NGO” to simplify these diverse frameworks when appropriate,
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but I will note their distinctions and draw upon certain elements of these other scholarly
traditions.
Sociologists, like Peter Haas, describe the role of epistemic communities, which are
“networks of knowledge-based experts” who play a role in “articulating the cause-and-effect
relationships of complex problems, helping states identify their interests, framing the issues for
collective debate, proposing specific policies, and identifying salient points for negotiation,”
through “control over knowledge and information” (Haas 1992, 2). Epistemic communities’
focus on specialized knowledge is crucial to NGOs’ use of information provision as a primary
strategy of influence. Gough and Shackley (2001) argue that NGOs participating within climate
change governance in the UNFCCC actually become part of the epistemic community, a
“partner” in governance rather than a representative of public opinion or constituencies.
In the field of political science, scholars describes NGOs as constituting “transnational
advocacy networks (TANs),” which share principled ideas and values on proscriptive policy
goals and organize globally (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Similar to epistemic communities, TANs
seek to influence policy based off common beliefs of the origin and nature of an issue, but
exceed the epistemic communities’ classification by advocating—as a cohesive, international
unit—for specific policies driven by agreed upon binding values and principles. Whereas
epistemic communities may share an understanding of the nature of an issue, they may not all
agree upon a specific remedy. TANs however, will advocate for practices and norms derived
from communally shared principles.
NGOs may be the principle actors within these other conceptual frames, but for the
purposes of this paper, I will not limit my investigation to TANs or epistemic communities.
Literature on TANs and epistemic communities will be used throughout the paper to augment
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claims about the nature and influence of NGOs, but for the starting point of analysis, this paper
will take a simple view of the broad community of NGOs. A presupposed characterization of
NGOs, like that of TANs or epistemic communities, would limit the frame of my analysis, no
matter how accurate and descriptive these frames may be for a number of individual cases.

NGO Classifications
NGOs are classified by scholars in a number of ways, based from their either interest,
ideology, constituent makeup, organizational structure, or strategic method. These
classifications, like the broad definition of NGOs, are often fluid and have overlap and
contradiction, but it is important to note how NGOs are conceptualized beyond a basic definition.
NGOs are most commonly classified according to the interests they represent or the issue,
which defines their participation in international environmental negotiations. Many NGOs are
described as “environmental NGOs,” referencing their general work across many areas of
environmental policy. These NGOs are often transnational in nature and not tied to a specific
geographical location or political group, but rather represent and advocate for environmentally
conscious action for the common good and benefit of all. NGOs like Greenpeace, who claim no
specific constituency, advocate for universal, environmentally friendly policy and will take up
many causes and individual issues to further their organizational mission.
Other more specific interest groups will advocate on behalf of a certain segment of a
population or for a specific sector or issue-area of international environmental negotiations.
Individual organizations representing groups to a specific geographical location, like the
Assembly of First Nations who represent indigenous peoples of North America, advocate on
behalf of their particular members on issues that directly impact their geographical area.
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Similarly, trade and industry groups participate to further the economic interests of their
constituents (specific industries) as they relate to environmental policy, like agricultural
associations advocating for land-use or sustainable agriculture policy.
Some NGOs function as networks between constituents, other NGOs, and IOs. These
umbrella organizations, like the prominent Climate Action Network (CAN), host discussions
amongst members to formulate a cohesive, unified policy. Regional councils or network
organizations will congregate NGOs from a particular area or industry to formulate policy
relevant to their common interests. As collectives, they can have a more concentrated impact and
message, but internal agreement and consensus can be difficult to establish.
Environmental NGOs are classified by their ideological stance towards the issue of
climate change, from institutional to radical. Generally, three categories of environmental NGOs
emerge, as described by Giorgetti (1998). First, “institutionalists” or the “ideological
mainstream” environmental NGOs seek to influence policy within the established framework of
institutions like the UNFCCC. Second, “social greens” or “deep ecologists” challenge the
structures and institutions that determine policy surrounding climate change, whether within the
North-South division or with an emphasis for “climate justice.” Finally, “radical
environmentalists” reject the work of international institutions and are critical of capitalism and
its role in environmental destruction. Ideological radicalism does not always mean radicalism in
tactic, but the radical environmentalists are known to have used extreme tactics.
These ideological perspectives translate into an “insider vs outsider” dichotomy to
describe NGOs inclusion in international negotiations. “Institutional” or “ideological
mainstream” NGOs are included within negotiating bodies because they are cooperative and
productive organizations within these IGOs. Ohanyan (2012) describes these organizations as
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being able to bridge gaps between civil society and IGOs, while others view NGO
“institutionalization” within IOs as evidence of the cooptation of civil society, especially under
the neoliberal frame (Gareau 2012). More socially focused NGOs, the “social greens” of
Giorgetti’s analysis, are increasingly included within international negotiations, especially in the
widening and opening of these bodies to the “intersectionality” of the climate change issue. The
recognition of the cross-cutting nature of climate change regarding issues of equity and
development opens space for these NGOs to introduce new perspectives and challenge common
thought within IOs.
The more radical NGOs, however, are left out of international negotiations, whether by
organizational preference and choice or by institutional rejection. NGOs who advocate radical
shifts in climate change governance tend to operate outside the designated spaces of international
environmental negotiations and are generally disregarded by mainstream actors, yet may still
have an impact on policy. Demonstrations outside of the official space, even when its message
simply communicates discontent, can inform policy makers within the institutional spaces, albeit
indirectly.9

NGO Strategy and Activities
NGOs use a variety of strategies and methods when attempting to influence international
environmental negotiations. Generally, there are four overarching activities areas in the policy
negotiation process: 1) issue framing and agenda setting, 2) knowledge provision and technical
assistance, 3) lobbying and campaigning, and 4) monitoring, implementing, and compliance.

9

See discussion of COP 15 in Copenhagen for a discussion of the role of outside protest.
(Bohmelt and Betzold 2013; Fisher 2010)
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These processes correspond roughly to the stage of negotiations, with issue framing and agendasetting prompting or occurring prior to negotiations, knowledge provision and technical
assistance coming in the pre-negotiation stage where states prepare their policy positions,
lobbying-campaigning occurring during the actual negotiations, and monitoring and
implementing taking place after an agreement has been reached.. However, these categories of
NGO activity are fluid. Agenda-setting can at times involve issue advocacy campaigning or the
provision of NGO research and expertise to classify an issue as relevant and demanding action.
And while agenda-setting and issue-framing generally occur before negotiations are conceived or
formally begin, new developments and issues can be framed or reframed throughout the
negotiation process.
Issue-framing and Agenda-setting
Issue-framing and agenda-setting is one of the first key spaces where NGO influence can
is observable and involves a number of preliminary elements of interaction. NGOs initially frame
an issue by identifying a phenomenon as an issue of public importance and classify it as within
the realm of governmental action. McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996) define issue-framing as
the “conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the
world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collection action” (6). These collective
understandings are transmitted throughout NGO networks and constituencies, creating “a sense
of public expectation” for political action (Newell 2000, 130). Issue-framing involves creating a
social environment or “frame” in which we recognize a phenomenon as demanding attention and
motivating political decision-makers to take action.
Issue-framing deals with public understanding of an issue, how a problem is
conceptualized. Political actors are the recipients of these strategies, but they can also involve the
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perceptions of the public (Willets 1996). Snow and Benford define a frame of an issues as “an
interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively
punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action within
one’s present or past environment” (Snow and Benford 1992, 137). NGOs involved in issueframing do so prior to political negotiations, seeking influence on “perceptions of a zone of
possible agreement” and thereby “establishing boundaries” of response (Sebenius 1992). Issueframing involves a broad, long-term campaign by NGOs which force perceptual shifts in social
consciousness and the classification (or reclassification) of issues.
Issue-framing also involves the creation of a spectrum of possible policy outcomes and
an agenda or process for prospective action. Keck and Sikkink (1998), utilizing the belief that
NGOs can control and command of information and ideas, argue that NGOs (as part of TANs)
can “alter the information and value contexts within which states make policies,” a process of
institutional “socialization” to the reality of an issue (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 16). They also
argue that issues can be reframed “in innovative ways and by seeking hospitable venues” for
these reinterpretations (17). By reframing issues in an adjusted context, NGOs aid states in
reexamining and reconsidering their national interests within these new frames.
Agenda-setting is related to issue framing, but demands concrete action on issues that has
been identified in a particular context. Betsill and Corell understand agenda setting as “a specific
phase of the policy process…and an ongoing process that occurs during the negotiation phase”
(Betsill and Corell 2008, 33), which is distinct in their analysis from issue-framing. Agendasetting, for Betsill and Corell, relates to the act of identifying an issue and demanding action by
policymakers, placing it upon their actual agenda for action. During negotiations, specific issues
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can be brought to public discussion in a number of ways, both in influencing the official
processes through the body governing negotiations or in informal settings like the press.
In summary, issue-framing relates to the recognition and conceptualization of a
phenomenon as an issue demanding public action, while agenda-setting involves the political
institution and decision-making process. Issue-framing and agenda-setting occur both
simultaneously and distinctly, yet both are key moments for considering NGO influence. If
NGOs are able to highlight an issue and conceptualize it in such a way that catalyzes action, one
could conclude that an NGO has an influence.
Information Provision
NGOs are key providers of information and technical assistance throughout the
international environmental negotiation process. Knowledge construction involves various
NGOs, including research institutions, reporting agencies, and regulatory watchdogs. They create
reports and primary research that support the constituted “frames” of a policy issue, offering
quantitative or qualitative justification for a certain policy options. From this constructed
knowledge, policy solutions and recommendations are presented by NGOs, supplementing and
intertwined with their issue-framing and agenda-setting objectives.
NGOs will complement scientific research on climate change and its various impacts, as
well as construct potential policy solutions through scholarly research. While the UNFCCC has a
United Nations mandated scientific body, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), who provides the authoritative scientific work on climate change, other NGOs seek to
contribute their own data and their own interpretations of already produced research. Large
research institutions, like the Tata Energy Research Institute, develop studies and primary source
material on issues of sustainable energy, climate vulnerabilities, and climate adaptation that is
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distributed to and cited by actors within international environmental negotiations, including
government delegations and other NGOs. Other organizations use their specialized knowledge in
a particular location, area, or issue to produce detailed policy proposals.
Keck and Sikkink describe NGOs as participating in “information politics,” which relies
upon the generation and distribution of relevant information (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 19). They
focus not only on the provision of scientific or technical information, but also highlight NGOs’
distribution of relevant subjective dialogues to influence policy discussions. These “testimonies,”
carefully selected by NGOs and their networks, present appeals by individuals or groups effected
by or concerned with the policy outcomes of negotiations, such as local or indigenous groups
directly impacted by global agreements. These discourses are often dramatic personal accounts
or ethical appeals to the principles and morals of the public and policy-makers and strive to
create a need for action.
NGOs derive legitimacy from the information which they control and distribute, and the
wider use of their research or reports could indicate a stronger influence. The use of NGO
generated research in climate negotiations relies heavily upon the relationship between the NGO
and government representatives. Newell notes that the use of NGO research by governments is
“highly dependent upon the willingness…of governments to open up the policy development
process to their participation,” that the influence of NGO research is conditional on factors of the
quality and legitimacy of the research, but also the external factors of government relationships
(Newell 2000, 133). While a high volume of material is produced and distributed within the
UNFCCC and to governmental delegations, not all research is influential with, well-received or
promoted by those who determine policy.
Lobbying and Campaigning
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Finally, the last key activity of NGOs within international environmental negotiations is
general lobbying and campaigning that occurs during the process of negotiations. These
advocacy efforts can be distinguished from the work of issue-framing and agenda-setting and
information provision in that they occur within the distinct time period in which negotiations
occur. NGOs use formal means to attempt to influence negotiations, like their accredited access
to negotiations by submitting written or oral statements to the UNFCCC and informal means like
consultations with policy makers. They may also campaign using the media and public
demonstrations to mobilize their networks and constituencies to pressure politicians.
Accredited NGOs are allowed to submit comments upon proposed texts and make
presentations within UN sanctioned forums. Rule 7 of Rules of Procedure for the UNFCCC
states that observer organizations “may…participate without the right to vote in proceedings of
any session in matters of direct concern to the body or agency they represent” (UNFCCC 1996).
Representatives will use these opportunities to make cases for various policy proposals, to argue
against particular text or language, or highlight omissions in the agreement. Large environmental
NGOs, like the Environmental Defense Fund or the Climate Action Network most often submit
these statements in the UNFCCC. These policy position papers are then displayed on the
UNFCCC’s official website, but not actively debated or included within the substance of
negotiations unless initiated by states. In this manner, NGOs remain an actor with a limited role
compared to those of states.
While these formal modes of participation may be limited in terms of activating NGO
influence, informal methods of lobbying are prevalent in within the UNFCCC. NGOs will
“lobby in the corridors [and] organize activities around the building where the negotiations take
place” (Arts 1998, 25), hoping to catch government delegates between negotiation sessions.
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While these meetings have been observed by scholars, describing what goes on within these
closed door or informal meetings is often difficult to pin down. Researchers are usually not
privileged to the private conversations between NGO representatives and their government
contacts, but ethnographic research suggests some indications of NGO influence. However,
much of the literature relies upon second hand reporting of these meetings from interviews with
government delegates or NGOs, limiting conclusions because of the nature of these observations
is colored by NGO or government “perceptions” (Arts 1998). These informal channels of
lobbying and advocacy could provide a great opportunity to observe NGO influence, but because
of the subjective, personal nature of the relationships that predicate these instances of lobbying, it
can be difficult to triangulate conclusions from of these second-hand observations alone.
Additionally, it is widely believed that once the governance process reaches the
negotiation phase most governments have already determined their national policies and stances
for negotiations. Newell notes the NGO perception that “states determine much of the scope for
compromise and negotiating space before international meetings that take place, and that there is
little that pressure groups can do to further their agenda once negotiations have begun” (Newell
2000, 138). In this regard, NGOs participate in the negotiation process on the margins, hoping to
prevent backsliding on commitments and push the collective agreement to its strongest and most
realized potential. Betzold (2014) and Betsill and Corell (2008) add that while the prenegotiation phase is perhaps the most crucial for opportunity for NGO influence, the first stages
of negotiations or the inauguration of a new regime, in which states determine the agenda and
principles of the negotiations, can also provide an opportune moment for NGO influence within
negotiations.
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NGOs also participate in wider efforts to influence negotiations during the process by
using media and demonstrations to inform the public and increase pressure upon government
negotiators. Keck and Sikkink (1998) describe these activities as examples of “leverage politics,”
which seek to influence policy decisions through coercive or persuasive means (Keck and
Sikkink 1998, 23). NGOs generally lack the “material leverage,” influence derived from
monetary or military power, and instead pressure states through “moral leverage” (Keck and
Sikkink 1998, 23).
Murdie and Urpelainen (2015) describe the “naming and shaming” strategy of NGOs to
target states that they do not agree with. To mobilize international action in the face of reluctant
state actors, NGOs highlight states who do not keep their international commitments or who stall
international agreement (Murdie and Urpelainen 2015). The newsletter “ECO,” published during
negotiations by the Climate Action Network, even includes a designation of the “Fossil of the
Day,” a degrading title for an actor or party who is perceived as stalling negotiations or
supporting retrograde or problematic policies. The shame associated with these labels is meant to
motivate action by the state in order to lose their bad reputation. Newell (2000) argues that in
addition to the punishment of these “naming and shaming” strategies, states may be incentivized
to act in ways that comply with NGO demands to avoid these designations. He notes however
that measuring an occurrence of this phenomena would be difficult, saying that “one other
channel of less visible or empirically demonstrable influence that environmental NGOs benefit
from, relates to the reactions that governments anticipate from NGOs and the public” (Newell
2000, 146).
NGOs relate news from international negotiations back to their respective constituencies
and through their organizational networks in hopes to mobilize domestic pressure on state actors.
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NGOs will hold press conferences and information sessions on the state of negotiations and
disseminate information through various forms of media, like newsletters, emails, conference
calls, newspaper columns, and social media. The Climate Action Network (CAN), an umbrella
group who includes many other major NGOs and regional bodies with localized NGO
membership, acts as a clearinghouse for civil society responses to negotiations. They translate
the complex, bureaucratic jargon of negotiations into popular discourse and popularize a
coherent and cohesive narrative of negotiations. Member organizations will spread these
narratives to their respective constituents and individuals.
Campaigns and demonstrations are organized by and amongst NGOs hoping to influence
negotiators. Petitions and letter-writing campaigns are common tools of NGO campaigns and are
presented to government representatives to demonstrate public support for NGO perspectives
and initiatives. Public demonstrations, organized worldwide, in domestic settings, or at the site of
negotiations engage the public in action and visually display the support for specific outcomes.
NGOs will also engage in protests or “counter-summitry” in opposition to negotiations or to
demand further action on environmental issues. Actions will block or disrupt the negotiation
process, as in COP 15 in Copenhagen in 2009 (Böhmelt and Betzold 2013), or NGOs will host
“parallel” meetings of civil society members adjacent to official negotiations. These parallel
meetings call into question the legitimacy of the international bodies and state sponsored actions,
as in the case of the People’s Summit in Rio de Janeiro organized in 2012 (Meek 2015). The
influence of these activities are difficult to gauge, but they do raise the profile of negotiations
and demand the attention of the public and delegates alike.
While these definitions, classifications, and descriptions are useful in conceptualizing
civil society participation and function as a starting point for a discussion of influence, they do
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not interrogate the actual political influence that these groups hold within the UNFCCC or other
similar policy spaces. In order to triangulate the influence of NGOs, one must utilize a
framework that critically analyzes NGO participation rather than simply describing their activity.
This framework must analyze NGOs within the context of the agreement, the positions of state
actors and the overall outcomes of negotiations.

Research Design and Methodology:
Roughly follow the research design described by Betsill and Corell in their work NGO
Diplomacy: The Influence of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Environmental
Negotiations, I used a methodology that combines participant observations with textual analysis,
triangulating NGO influence through their participation in the COP and in their relation to the
Indian government.
Betsill and Corell’s design draws observations of NGO activity from a process-tracing
methodology of participant observations and document analysis. They qualitatively assess an
NGO’s influence in a number of key “indicators” through goal attainment analysis and
counterfactuals. This framework functions for a variety of NGOs and their various types, but it is
specifically to NGOs within the institutional framework of IGOs.
My design draws from their framework approach, loosely following their process tracing
form, but develops an overview and analysis of each case without specifically focusing on a
single issue. Process tracing, defined by Collier (2011, 824) as an “analytic tool for drawing
descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence—often understood as part
of a temporal sequence of events,” allowed me to track the progression and evolution of NGO
activities over time. Because of the complexity of the climate change issue and the various
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approaches and perspectives present in civil society, isolating a specific topic proved impossible.
Rather, by conceptualizing these organizations more generally, I was able to describe their
influence in a more holistic way. By describing the evolution of Indian climate policy from the
early 1990s to the present, I was able to situate my NGO cases within this historical narrative.
Counterfactuals allow me to speculate the result of the negotiations and the state of
international environmental policy without the participation of NGOs, a sort of null hypothesis
that can supplement my claims of NGO influence. Counterfactuals too can “uncovered instances
where NGOs were not influential despite a correlation between NGO activities and the observed
effect” (Betsill 2008, 179), further strengthening my claims. Newell (2000, 34, 124) also notes
the necessity of counterfactuals, saying that the “counterfactual argument about whether the
outcomes could be expected in the absence of NGO campaigning” can establish a clearer
conclusion on the causal relationship between NGOs and policy outcomes. Additionally, by
providing background into the Indian state’s policies and interests in environmental issues and
climate change, I will be able to hypothesize their possible positions without the presence of
NGOs.

NGO Influence
Influence is a difficult concept to precisely define. Arts (1988) weakly establishes the
causal element of influence in his definition, with influence as “the achievement of (a part of)
one’s policy goal with regard to an outcome in treaty formation and implementation, which is (at
least partly) caused by one’s own and international intervention in the political arena and process
concerned” (58). These definitions focus upon the result, the text of an agreement or the
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conclusion of negotiations, but directly observing results that can be attributed to a single actors’
activities are difficult in international spaces.
Especially in such a diverse and complex policy space such as the UNFCCC and COP,
drawing definite conclusions is a challenge for any researcher or observer. The number of actors
alone, from states to NGOs, each with their own unique policy perspectives, must compromise
and negotiate an agreement that will at least partially satisfy all those involved. NGOs lack the
institutional ability to determine policy directly as observers to the political decision-making
process and must instead work through individual state actors to bring about change in the results
of negotiations. An analysis of NGO influence in international environmental policy must
therefore address NGOs’ influence with individual states and state policy, adapting a more
traditional look at domestic level lobbying.
A more nuanced definition regards the perception of influence, rather than any concrete
or textual indication of influence. Influence according to Newell (2000, 34), “can be found in the
degree to which other actors take notice of NGOs, in the documentation of successful campaigns
in the context of observable changes.” These relative perceptions are difficult to ascertain and
require in-depth correspondence between networks of actors. The conclusions of these analyses
are not explicit proof of influence, but rather the catalogue of subjective impressions that can
inform other methodological approaches (Arts 1998).
Oftentimes, conclusions of the influence of one actor are dependent upon relative
comparisons to other actors. There is no standardized score or index for level of influence, but
rankings can be assigned when comparing similar NGOs based upon indicators of their
influence. We can make judgements in comparison, finding the manner of degree in which an
actor can have an effect upon negotiations and describe it qualitatively.
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I will use Betsill and Corell’s definition of influence, which describes a situation where
“one actor intentionally communicates to another so as to alter the latter’s behavior from what
would have occurred otherwise” (Betsill and Corell 2008, 24). This definition encompasses other
definitions of influence, but broadens the classification by including the use of counterfactuals
(“from what would have occurred otherwise”), which allows for a more direct causal relationship
to be established.
Betsill and Corell (2008) draw evidence of NGO influence in these five areas: 1) issueframing; 2) agenda-setting; 3) the position of key states; 4) the procedures of the negotiated
agreement; and 5) the substance of the negotiated agreement. These indicators establish the
possible locations and spaces in the policy process where NGO influence can be observed. The
first three indicators discuss the influence of NGOs within the process of negotiations, while the
final two indicators could demonstrate NGO influence in the outcome of negotiations. Both of
these spaces are important to negotiations, as the process of negotiations can define how an issue
is discussed and debated, while the outcome of negotiations demonstrate the overall influence of
NGO activities.

Data Collection
Using a number of separate data sources, I triangulated NGO influence through a holistic
discussion of their activities and relationships to the UNFCCC and state delegations. This
analysis required the inclusion of both publically available reports and documents from NGOs,
state delegations, and UN agreements, as well as private interviews and surveys collected by the
author and participant observations collected at both COP 21 and COP 22. I was able to collect
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data while in abroad in India, visiting a number of NGOs and conducting interviews with
representatives of their organization.
I made observations in Paris during the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) in
November 2015, while studying in India in the spring of 2016, and at COP 22 in November of
2016. As a participant observer to the UNFCCC, I interviewed a number of Indian NGOs in
Paris and Marrakech, was a participant observer to their work throughout the Conference. I spent
much of my time at the COP attending events in which my cases were presenting or speaking
publically. These Side Event presentations allowed NGOs to have a more official space in which
to promote their ideas and offered me the opportunity to understand the ways in which the
organizations presented themselves publically. Interviews with delegates and representatives
added a more in-depth and personal element to my understandings of these organizations and
their work, sometimes yielding a glimpse into the “insider” world of Indian climate politics.
These primary observations are supplemented with other secondary methods of data
collection, including a textual analysis of organizational publications and public statements.
Analysis of NGO publications provided a baseline of research for establishing organization goals
and programs, as well as a good source for determining the language that NGOs use to describe
their policy positions.

Case Study
Indian Environmental Situation
Two interrelated issues dominate India’s stance in international environmental politics:
the extreme needs of development and the environmental degradation that accompanies growth.
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India faces incredible challenges concerning environmental issues, but development
issues tend to garner more attention from policymakers and politicians. This is understandable
given India’s great development needs, with 363 million people (about 30% of the population)
living in poverty and around 20% of the population without access to regular electricity (“India
CIA World Factbook). These circumstances of underdevelopment force India to prioritize
development projects alongside worldwide environmental initiatives. While sometimes
prioritizing development ahead of environmental concerns, India has expressed eagerness to
utilize the “co-benefits” of environmental action to meet development goals.
In 2015, India became the third largest producer of greenhouse gases, calculated in total
production of carbon dioxide, due to their growing energy sector and the increasing demands for
power (CAIT 2017). The energy sector, primarily reliant upon coal power, accounts for 74% of
the country’s emissions (MOEFCC 2015). India’s high population, combined with the poverty,
underdevelopment, and less consumptive lifestyles, results in a very low per capita greenhouse
gas emissions. Distributed equally amongst the entire population, the per capita emissions of
India are just a fraction of those of the developing world (MOEFCC 2015).
India is considered one of the “extremely” vulnerable nations to the effects of climate
change. The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the United Nations’ leading
scientific body that aggregates data from climate scientists across the globe, described in its Fifth
Assessment Report (AR5) the various sectors of Indian life compromised by the effects of
climate change. They predict, from their moderate scenario model, serious effects to Indian
weather, agriculture, and health.
India relies upon the season monsoons for much of its water resources. Impacts of
climate change will disrupt the normal seasonal cycle, which is relied upon for agriculture and
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domestic water use, changing the intensity and duration of the monsoon season. The IPCC
predict that some areas of India will see an increase in the summer monsoons, leading to
flooding and the increase of water-borne disease, while other areas will experience longer and
more intense droughts and heat waves in the summer months. In addition to these general trends,
India is also vulnerable, with its large costal populations, to an increase in the frequency and
intensity of extreme weather events and to various health impacts.
Agricultural losses due to the impacts of climate change are predicted to be great in India.
India provides 15% of the world’s wheat, upon which 200 million people rely. Based off its
moderate scenario models the IPCC predicts that wheat yields could decrease by 51% due heat
stress (IPCC 2014, 1344). Additionally, unpredictable and reduced rainfall would shorten the
growing season in many areas in India, cutting off the availability of food for many small
farmers. The IPCC reports that the agricultural industry could lose more than $7 billion in 2030
with increased global temperature rise, but that with proper implementation of mitigation and
adaptation strategies, losses could be reduced greatly (IPCC 2014, 1351).

Indian Government Structures
The structures that govern Indian environmental and climate change policy have evolved
slowly into a complex network of actors. In an analysis of Indian environmental policy, Rajan
argues “the dominant feature of the policy-making process in India has undoubtedly been the
autonomy of the government in shaping policy. Other actors…have generally exercised very
little influence” (Rajan 1997, 12). This autonomy allows the Indian government to maintain its
control and discretion over the national policy without the inclusion of dissenting perspectives.
This extensive bureaucracy is criticized as being “confusing” and inefficient by some
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commentators (Never 2012). Through a tight control of information, the government limits the
participation of other actors and solidifies its power.
Indian policy is guided by the work of the Planning Commission, which convenes to
produce Five-Year Plans that outline policy objectives across many sectors. These centralized
Plans first engaged environmental issues in 1971, prior to the U.N. Conference on the Human
Environment, and have played a role in clarifying Indian policy and leading a focus on
environmental issues (Ganguly, 2016).
In 1992, in the 8th Five Year Plan, the Planning Commission recognized the upcoming
conference on climate change and put forth some of the underlying positions of India’s
negotiating position, stating:
“it is essential that these negotiations recognize the aspirations of large masses of
poor people and do not impose any burden on developing countries, respecting
their sovereign right over their resources. Transfer of technology, flow of new and
additional resources to developing countries to fully meet any additional cost are
pre-requisites to international cooperation in the environment sector” (Planning
Commission, 1992).
This declaration guided the development of Indian policy in international negotiations for
over 20 years and still outlines the basis of Indian policy today.
The Ministry of Environment and Forests (MOEF) was formed in 1985 as the primary
body to address environmental issues after years of unorganized management. It oversees
multiple divisions that address specific areas of environmental concern, such as conservation,
water management, desertification, wildlife, and cooperation with international organizations.
The MOEF is composed of both general civil servants and specialists in environmental fields,
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resulting in conflict between the political and scientific elements of the Ministry (Rajan 1997).
One branch of the MOEF, International Cooperation, focuses solely on international
environmental negotiations and is responsible for translating and communicating Indian
domestic policy in the international arena.
Additional bodies supplement the Ministry’s work on climate change, including the
Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change, the Indian Network for Climate Change
Assessment, as well as other Ministries of the Indian government like the Ministry of Earth
Sciences, Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Science and Technology. These bodies
played important roles at different times in the history of climate change governance and
international negotiations, but some scholars and former policymakers note that a lack of
communication and coordination within the various arms of the climate change bureaucracy lead
to inefficiencies and redundancy (Rajamani 2009; Never 2012).
To coordinate the formation of Indian climate policy, Prime Minister Narendra Modi
formed the Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change in 2007. The Council became a major
policymaking body in 2009 during the drafting of the National Action Plan on Climate Change
(NAPCC). For many grassroots organizations, the Council represented the elite of Indian society,
with almost every representative located in New Delhi and the inner working of the Council kept
secretive (Thaker and Leiserowitz 2014). Composed of heads of various agencies and including
civil society members, with representatives from the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE)
and The Energy Research Institute (TERI), the Council made recommendations to the Prime
Minister in the policy formation process, but lost prominence in years following (Never 2012). In
2014, the Council was reconvened, but with changes in civil society membership—CSE lost
their seat, replaced a number of TERI members (MOEFCC 2014). The Council is working to
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extend and implement the missions of the National Action Plan on Climate Change, coordinating
the actions of state governments, and local initiatives.
The policy formation process surrounding Indian climate change policy is somewhat
unknown, described in part as a “black box” process without much observation by outsiders and
scholars (Ganguly 2016). Historically, climate change policy has been characterized as being
dominated by insiders and bureaucrats, and the discourse on climate change “limited to a narrow
segment of India’s educated and urban elite” (Rajamani 2009, 354). The Indian climate change
bureaucracy remained remarkably constant in membership and personnel with little turnover in
leadership positions during the 1990s and 2000s (Never 2012). Rajamani (2009) notes that the
framing of the issue of climate change was limited domestically to “small groups of influential
diplomats and high-ranking government officials” (Rajamani 2009, 356).
Ganguly (2016), however, offers a different possible model for describing the Indian
environmental policy environment. She describes the policy process in India as not following
tradition, “linear,” model, but rather suggests a “nonlinear” model of “subjective and dynamic
interactions between state and non-state actors, [and] the values and beliefs of the actors
involved” (Ganguly 2016, 4). This description of the policy process allows for the creation of
“policy spaces” and the participation of non-state actors to engage in “deliberative democracy.”
Deliberative democracy allows for “direct roles for citizens to co-govern and engage with more
substantive policy reform and be assured of government responses to their demands” (Ganguly
2016, 13). Her case studies of environmental legislation explore the application of this model of
deliberative democracy in India, using the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan and
the Other Traditional Forest Dwellers Act.
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India, as a federation of states, also requires state and local action to address
environmental and climate change issues. In 2009, states were required to develop State Action
Plans on Climate Change (SAPCC), but the expertise and capabilities to create and implement
these plans is varied among states. The unequal implementation at the state and local level results
in tension between national level aspirations and local abilities (Mayrhofer and Gupta 2016).
Additionally, because of the elitism of national policy construction, the central government at
times ignores and is insulated from the effects of policy on local communities (Kohli and Menon
2016).

Indian Climate Policy
Indian policy on environmental issues has remained remarkably stable since its inception
in the 1970s. Despite its many iterations throughout issues of environmental concerns and its
gradual evolution over time, Indian policy maintains a concern for priorities of development and
poverty reduction at its heart.
In Stockholm in 1972, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi gave a speech that outlined the basic
premises of the Indian and developing country perspective on global environmental issues.
Gandhi called upon the global community to recognize the needs of impoverished countries
while strongly condemning the values of profit and efficiency, embodied in the developed
world’s priorities (Gandhi 1975). In her speech, she coined the tagline that “poverty and need
[are] the greatest polluters,” a statement that underscored the necessity to address development
issues alongside environmental ones, and advocated for a change in behavior by the developed
world as the primary solution for environmental issues (Gandhi 1975, 193).
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Since Indira Gandhi’s speech, three ideological groupings are used to describe the
positions of major Indian actors, both governmental and nongovernmental, which frame the
narratives of Indian climate policy (Dubash 2012). First, the “growth first stonewallers” argue
that the entire climate change regime is unfounded and undermines India’s critical development
priorities. This camp held influence in the 1990s and early 2000s but the growth of the belief that
India can achieve both its development agenda and climate change goals has decreased the
influence of the “growth first” group (Malik 2014). While development still remains a top
priority for Indian policy in general and continues to frame India’s negotiation rhetoric in
international climate negotiations, an acceptance of the other two ideological frames of climate
policy have become more prominent.
The second ideological group, the “progressive realists,” recognize the reality of climate
change and its potentially damaging effects on India’s domestic situation, but are resistant to
international means and mechanisms to address the global threat of climate change (Dubash
2012). Keen on emphasizing the historical responsibility of the global North in the creation of
the majority of greenhouse gas emissions, these realists emphasize domestic action over
international cooperation, “delinking” international action on climate change from domestic
measures. They argue that India’s development agenda can be achieved through actions with
sustainable components and that Indian climate policy should focus on adaptive measures that
protect Indian domestic interests (Malik 2014).
Finally, the “progressive internationalists” argue that India must engage internationally in
institutions like the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in order to
address climate change and maintain the principles of the lesser developed world (Dubash 2009).
These internationalists argue that India will miss opportunities internationally if they adopt an
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isolationist approach to climate change action and will allow the global North to dictate the terms
of climate change governance without Indian representation (Joshi 2013). They also contend that
India has a responsibility to advocate for the interests of the rest of the developing world and are
positioned to lead in this regard. The argue that the “co-benefits” of climate action, including
development, a stronger economy, and international prestige, that will allow India to flourish
(Mayrhofer and Gupta 2016). In recent years, these “progressive internationalists” have
conquered much of the discourse on climate change as evident by India’s engagement with
international institutions and policy.
Beginning in 1992 with the formation of the UNFCCC, India has maintained a set of
principles and a unique approach to climate change characterized by a reliance on the notions of
historical responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions and equity in emissions as related to
development, and the principle of “Common but Differentiated Responsibilities” (CBDR).
Lavanya Rajamani suggest that “the Indian stance injects historicity into the negotiations; it
helps fashion a global environmental narrative that is sensitive to the needs of developing
countries” (Rajamani 2009, 358). This founding position informs India’s policy to this day, but
its strict adherence to an interpretation of these rules has shifted to allow for Indian action on
climate change.
India uses the idea of historical responsibility for climate change to lay the blame of
temperature rise caused by greenhouse gas emissions on Northern, developed countries like the
United States, allowing India to argue that there is little responsibility for the lesser developed
world to act to mitigate climate change. The global north is responsible for the majority of
historical emissions, but these developed countries argue that emerging economies like China
and India are now currently contributing emissions that rival their current emissions, thus

49

redistributing the burden to act (Hochstetler and Milkoreit 2015). India, up until 2009, resisted
any definite domestic actions to mitigate their greenhouse gases because of this perspective.
A second narrative in Indian climate politics is a calculation of “per capita emissions”
that was first proposed by researches working for the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE)
in 1991. Their report, entitled “Global Warming in an Unequal World: A Case of Environmental
Colonialism,” argued that developed nations had prospered in part due to carbon emissions and
that their lifestyles, per capita, produced much more emissions than lesser developed nations
(Agarwal and Narain 1991). Therefore, in order to fully meet development goals and achieve
global equality, developing nations have a right to emit carbon emissions. A rejection of this
principle would amount to “climate colonialism,” a continuation of Northern control and
domination of Indian resources and a perpetuation of underdevelopment (CSE 1990). While the
metric of per capita emissions did not become a formalized measure in the UNFCCC or within
scientific communities for mitigation of climate change, Indian negotiators frequently cite the
concept in their appeals for equity and justice in the climate change regime (Rajan 1997,
Rajamani 2009).
While per capita emissions accounting was not adopted in the UNFCCC, the principle of
Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) was written into the framework agreement.
This principle establishes the notion of “differentiation” between those nations historically
responsible for greenhouse gas emissions and the lesser developed world. In the Kyoto Protocol,
this differentiation was actualized in the designation of “Annex I” and “Annex II” nations,
determining which nations had legal cause to act on climate change mitigation. Annex I
countries or the developed world were required to stabilize their emissions and meet emission
reduction goals, while Annex II nations had no specific obligations. The CBDR principle has
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slowly evolved over time from the Kyoto Protocol’s strict interpretation, with the climate change
regime requiring an emphasis on the “common,” universal participation in the mitigation of
climate change, thus opening up space for action by the developing world.
India, while at first being completely resistant to the notion of contributing to mitigation
efforts, has slowly participated in planning and promising action on climate change. In the runup to COP 15 in Copenhagen, Denmark in 2009, India submitted their National Action Plan on
Climate Change (NAPCC) and voluntarily agreed to reduce its emissions intensity by 20-25% by
2020. The NAPCC outlines India’s environmental situation, the threats posed to India by climate
change, and the steps and actions India planned on taking to address climate change. Produced
by the Prime Ministers Council on Climate Change and the MOEFCC, it describes “Eight
National Missions” aimed at addressing climate change, including programs for the development
of solar energy, increased energy efficiency, sustainable urban planning, air and water quality,
protecting the Himalayan ecosystems, the protection of forests, agriculture development, and
research on climate change (Gov. of India 2009). The government elaborates upon each mission
with strategies for implementation and financing, but also relies on much to be decided by
specialized agencies and state action. The implementation of the Missions have reached various
degrees of success and have been and criticized by civil society members of the Prime Minister’s
Council as being vague and lacking in ambition (Never 2012, Thaker and Leiserowitz 2014).
However, the NAPCC is understood as a major moment in India’s participation within the
UNFCCC as a constructive member of the international community and as an indication of
India’s recognition of their own responsibilities (Malik 2014; Rajamani 2009).
Furthering India’s commitment to act on climate change and to comply with the
UNFCCC’s program in the lead up to COP 21, India released its “Intended Nationally
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Determined Contribution (INDC)” in 2015. India’s INDC sets the target of a 20-25% reduction
of India’s emissions intensity of its GDP over 2005 levels by 2020 (Gov. of India 2015). Similar
to its NAPCC, India’s INDC outlines strategies for meeting its mitigation commitments through
clean energy development, energy efficiency, and carbon sinks, as well as methods for adapting
to the effects of climate change, and plans for mobilizing financing (Gov. of India 2015). India’s
INDC rearticulates India’s priority of economic development and notes that successful
implementation of the INDC is conditional upon financing from the developed world, a
reiteration of the importance of the CBDR principle.
India at COP21
Prime Minister Narendra Modi delivered an opening address to the UNFCCC at COP 21
that articulated India’s continued commitment to climate action and reinforced the guiding
principles of justice and equity. After confirming India’s “ambitious” INDC contributions, Prime
Minster Modi made moral arguments for CBDR and called on developed nations to “fulfil their
responsibilities” to the world. Modi also stressed that developed country action is not depended
solely upon the idea of historical responsibility, but rather that developed nations have “the most
room to make [emission] cuts and make the strongest impact” (Modi 2015).
Indian negotiators reflected Prime Minister Modi’s hopes and concerns throughout the
Conference. “India wants a very ambitious and durable Paris agreement, anchored in the
principles of the UNFCCC,” Additional Secretary Susheel Kumar of the MOEFCC said in a
press conference (Kumar 2015). Mr. Kumar also stressed that lifestyle change is necessary to
climate action; technology alone cannot solve climate change.
Different priorities of mitigation (developed countries) and adaptation (developing). For
developing nations like India, adaptation programs focus action upon additional priority issues
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like poverty and food security. A program for loss and damages programs have the “full support”
of the Indian government, due to the high vulnerability of the Indian people10. The framework
for addressing losses and damages was included in the text of the Paris Agreement, a major win
for developing countries that ensures future work on the issue, but many observers criticized the
lack of concrete language in the language of the text (Taub et. al. 2016).
Climate finance was one of the most contentious issues for India at Paris. On the eve of
the opening of COP21, the Indian Ministry of Finance released a discussion paper that
challenged the credibility of a report on climate finance issued by the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD). Calling the OECD report “deeply flawed and
unacceptable,” this paper set the tone for confrontation on climate finance (DEA 2015). India
advocated for clear and credible financial contributions from developed countries, without the
“double counting, mislabeling and misreporting” found in the OECD report. Prime Minister
Modi echoed this sentiment in his opening address, calling for developed countries to mobilize
100 billion US dollars annually by 2020 (Modi 2015). India argued that additional climate action
by developing nations require additional finance from developed nations, per the language of the
Convention and the principles of climate justice.
India took a lead in mobilizing finance for renewable energy projects in developing
nations through their leadership in the formation of the International Solar Alliance. Launched at
COP21 with France, the Alliance matches developed country finance and technological expertise
with developing nations seeking to expand their renewable energy capabilities. Prime Minister
Modi, in his opening address at the launch event of the Alliance, stressed the importance of
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providing financing to developing countries and called upon the traditions and lore of India to
support his value laden claims.11
India characterized itself as “critical” in the formation of the Paris Agreement and signed
on after to the Agreement in October of 2016 (MOEFCC 2016a). Overall, the Indian delegation
stressed that the language of the Paris Agreement should not “undermine” the principles and
commitments outlined in the original framework text of the UNFCCC and underscored the
importance of pre-2020 action before the Paris Agreement comes into force.
India at COP22
After signing the Paris Agreement in October 2016, India signaled that it would continue
to act on behalf of and represent the developing world, argue for the principles of equity and
CBDR, and hold Northern states to their obligations based on historical responsibility. In a press
release, the MoEFCC stated that at COP 22, India would “protect the interests and strongly
present the viewpoint of Developing Countries” while enhancing ambition and implementation
of the Paris Agreement (MOEFCC 2016b).
At COP22, India continued many of its previously elucidated negotiation positions and
maintained a strong, visual presence in the country pavilion space at the COP. In negotiation
sessions, the Indian Party primarily discussed the need for clear, predictable climate finance,
increased ambition, and the continuation of the UNFCCC principles of historical responsibility
and Common but Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR). India advocated for an increase in the
definite commitments to climate finance, again arguing that developed countries have a greater
obligation to contribute to climate finance mechanisms and funds. Indian negotiators also
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highlighted the need for new, creative sources of financing, both within and outside of the frame
of the UNFCCC, and stressed the importance of developing carbon markets.
India also continued their advocacy for action before the Paris Agreement enters into
force in 2020. In his opening address, the Minister of the MOEFCC, Mr. Anil Madhave Dave,
argued that pre-2020 actions are crucial to the long-term sustainability of any climate agreement.
“It is absolutely critical and necessary that equal focus is given to Pre -2020 actions by
developed countries under Kyoto Protocol and that they provide effective Finance, Technology
Transfer and Capacity building support to developing countries,” Minister Dave stated to the
COP (UNFCCC 2016).
In many regards, India took on a more technical and implementation focused rhetoric at
COP 22, they did not completely give up their principles based approach. Events at the Indian
pavilion highlighted the need for incorporating elements of sustainable living into everyday life
and renewed emphasis on climate justice in implementation. India especially emphasized the
need for the use of the principles of the UNFCCC during the process of the global stocktake, a
verification process under which countries report their progress under the Paris Agreement and
make renewed commitments to climate action. Under the principles of CBDR and historical
responsibility, India argues that developed countries should be held to a higher standard during
the global stocktake.

Role of Civil Society in Indian Climate Policy
I have selected a number of nongovernmental organizations that are located and primarily
act in India. These organizations, while participating in a range of environmental issues, have a
select focus on climate change and a strong presence in national and international climate change
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policy discussions. While they may also focus on local issues like development, pollution, or
water quality, these organizations still have a department or branch that is solely dedicated to the
larger questions of Indian and international climate policy. They also utilize a range of strategies
and tactics in their attempts to influence climate policy, including conducting primary research,
organizing campaigns and mobilizing the public, and directly lobbying policymakers and
government delegates. This wide swath of activities allows me to test a number of factors that
may determine their influence. Each organization is an officially accredited observer
organization to the UNFCCC.
I have chosen not to include transnational organizations that are founded and primarily
act outside of India. These organizations, like the World Wildlife Fund, the Climate Action
Network, or Greenpeace, have branches of their organizations that operate and focus on Indian
environmental issues, but because they do not originate in India, I have chosen to exclude them
from my analysis. The relationship between domestic NGOs and transnational NGOs is
fundamentally different and outside the scope of this paper.
Fisher (2012) describes the role of NGOs within Indian climate policy, addressing both
the domestic and international levels of policy. Her analysis classifies Indian NGOs into three
categories, 1) National and transnational NGOs, 2) Regional NGOs, 3) local or municipal NGOs,
each category containing distinct policy preferences and discourses on climate change. But these
particularities break down at the international policy level, subsumed under a unified Indian
discourse, guided by a nebulous “NGO network.” In international policy spheres, Indian actors
become part of a “single discourse coalition” (Fisher 2012, 122). This “climate nationalism”
stands opposed to the “climate imperialism” of foreign interests, creating national unity in
international climate policy. Fisher concludes “there is a latent discursive struggle between
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actors within the coalition which is deliberately suppressed in the international political stream
and cannot find political space at the national level” (Fisher 2012, 122).
Within a model of deliberative democracy, participation and exchange between state and
non-state actors takes two forms according to Ganguly. She describes situations in which nonstate actors are formally “invited” to take part in policy discussion, thus occupying policy spaces
created and opened by the government and other situations in which civil society “invent” spaces
for their own participation. Within “invited” political spaces, NGOs participate directly within a
system of deliberative democracy and existing policy related issues; they are consultants,
selected for their expertise, positioning, or constituency, to augment existing government efforts
to address climate change problems. In “invented” spaces, NGOs must frame issues and mobilize
interest in certain political solutions to be included as leaders on an issue, a grassroots form of
power that attracts government recognition.
This dichotomy allows for NGOs and other non-state actors to act as institutionalized
members of the climate change regime that supplement and cooperate with government actions
and function as critics of government policy on climate change outside of the established
political space. Ganguly states that “Civil society in the context of India both has a
collaborationist approach as it works with the government to tackle with problems that are
mutually agreed upon and at other times takes on an adversarial role and stands in direct
opposition to the state” (Ganguly 2016, 44).
While Ganguly’s characterization of the role of civil society is a useful example of the
possibility for deliberative democratic participation in India, the most crucial element of her
argument is in the bifurcated nature of participation. Other scholars note this division between
insider NGOs and those who participate on the outside, but conclude that outsider groups have
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little influence on government policy. Thaker and Leisorowitz (2014) claim the rise of grassroots
environmental organizations, like the People’s Science Movement and Indian Climate Justice,
caused the Indian government to expand the scope of their policy on climate change and create
the Indian Network on Climate Change Assessment, which focuses on adaptation and the
vulnerability of the Indian people. However, their analysis fails to consider the wider political
climate that preempt the claims made by these organizations, that the movement for a renewed
focus on adaptation was already present in the global climate discourse.

Centre for Science and the Environment (CSE)
Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) is a prominent “public interest research and
advocacy organization” located in New Delhi, India that has participated in discussions of
international climate change negotiations and has informed the Indian climate policy since its
establishment in 1992. Founded by environmentalist Anil Agarwal, the Centre engages in
environmental policy in areas of climate change, energy, waste and water management,
pollution, food safety, and others, advocating for change through “knowledge based activism”
(CSE “Overview). To illustrate its prominence, CSE was featured in the recent Leonardo
DiCaprio documentary on climate change, “Before the Flood,” offering a developing country
perspective that called out developed countries’ consumption habits as the main drivers of
climate change.
CSE is often cited for their landmark report “Global Warming in an Unequal World: A
Case of Environmental Colonialism,” published in 1991 by Anil Agarwal and Sunita Narain,
which outlines a developing countries view on a global response to global temperature rise
(Agarwal and Narain 1991). The report is a response to a commonly cited World Resource
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Institute (WRI) document that framed the issue of climate change without regards for
development and allowed for the continued pollution by developed countries. CSE, using its own
calculations, responded to this assertion by claiming that the WRI’s calculations were
fundamentally flawed and unfair, and proposed their own model built on a per capita basis. Their
calculations demonstrate that industrialized countries already had exhausted their portion of the
“carbon budget” in 1986, essentially arguing that developed countries needed to immediately
stop all greenhouse gas emissions (Agarwal and Narain 1991).
From this initial report, CSE became the premier proponent of the equity-based argument
for climate change action. Arts notes that CSE was an “exception” in the principle stage of the
UNFCCC negotiations and the organization “already stressed the equity principle in the climate
arena even before the [Intergovernmental Negotiating Committees] had formally started” (Arts
1998, 120). The preeminence of CSE in terms of representing developing country interests at the
outset of the UNFCCC and climate policy cannot be understated.
The report became the basis for Indian climate policy and offered the Indian government
an independent account to challenge Northern research. The Indian government has cited the
study in a number of their own documents and it is widely cited by other NGOs and researchers
in the field. Rajan claims that CSE’s 1991 report had “significant impacts on Indian policy”
(Rajan 1997, 117). Additionally, the perspective outlined by Agarwal and Narain became the
foundation for the developing country perspective in international climate negotiations for much
of the 1990s thanks to the promotion of the Indian government (Rajan 1997).
CSE also defends India and other developing countries interests as they relate to
developed countries. In international arenas, CSE has criticized developing countries as
“hijacking the agenda, resources and policy effort away from more immediate and pressing
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issues in developing countries” (Gough and Shackley 2001, 334) While CSE’s activities
expanded to many different projects and issue areas, the theme and narrative of a globally
equitable share of culpability and responsibility for environmental damages persists.
This perspective is most evident in a report released in 2015, ahead of COP 21, called
“Captain America-US Climate Goals: A Reckoning.” This report directly criticizes U.S. climate
policy and argues that per capita emissions in the U.S. are “flagrantly high” (CSE 2015). The
report goes on to analyze the United States’ INDC and other climate action plans and criticizes
the hypocrisy of U.S. negotiation strategies. “Captain America” is one of the most direct
criticisms leveled against developed countries by CSE and provides developing country
negotiators with statistics to attack the developed world’s contributions to global climate action.
Despite their historical role for defending developing countries and India, CSE is also
very conscious of maintaining their independence from governments and donors. They refuse
official government commissions, but work in evaluating and providing input on developing
policy.12 This independence allows CSE to simultaneous critique Indian government positions
while maintaining their role in informing Indian policy.
At COP 21, CSE engaged extensively with the Indian government to push forward this
agenda of equity in climate action and in operating these values within the context of the Paris
Agreement. The Indian government created a space in the Indian Pavilion with the broad theme
of equity and its operationalization in the UNFCCC, allowing CSE to be free to conduct its
research and present its framework on its own terms.13 At the Indian Pavilion, CSE hosted and
moderated two discussions, “Operationalizing Equity: Ensuring High and Sustainable Human
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Development for All” and “The Imperative of Fair Distribution of Carbon Budget for an
Effective Climate Agreement.” These presentations outlined a number of frameworks for linking
emissions and the Human Development Index. In order to raise developing countries standard of
living to an acceptable “developed” level, CSE argued, these countries would be entitled to a
definite share of the global carbon budget well beyond that of the developed world. India and the
rest of the developing world, CSE claimed, has a right to demand the “carbon space” necessary
for sustainable development. India’s Minister of Environment, Forestry, and Climate Change
Shri Prakash Javadekar attended the presentations, a presence which demonstrated the
government’s endorsement of these policy positions.
Also at COP 21, CSE also introduced a framework for achieving renewable energy
targets while ensuring electrical provision for all, in a report titled “Programme for Global
Renewable Energy and Energy Access Transformation (GREEAT). Using CSE’s equity
framework, GREEAT provides technical recommendations for providing renewable energy
globally in an egalitarian and affordable way. The report highlights the need for an alternative
model of electrification, developed with the support of international mechanisms and funding
from developed countries. “The future of energy is decentralized distributed and renewable,”
said CSE deputy director Chandra Bhushan (CSE 2015a). The GREEAT program is indicative of
CSE more drastically egalitarian approach than other NGOs in India and reflects the consistency
of CSE’s concern for equity. CSE advocated for GREEAT’s inclusion into the decision of
COP21, but there were no indications that the report influenced government statements or policy
preferences.
Following the adoption of the Paris Agreement, CSE was very critical of the final text,
calling it “weak and un-ambitious” (CSE 2015b). Ms. Narain also commented that developed
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nations had stolen the narrative of climate action and displayed “intolerance” in opposing any
challenge to the dominant narrative, all while failing to substantially address developing
countries concerns (Narain 2015). Deputy Director Mr. Bhushan wrote that India was in need of
a new strategy for negotiations—that over 20 years of discussions of principles are “insufficient”
in the world of “climate change realpolitik” (Bhushan 2015). He even criticized CSE’s own role
in promoting the Indian and developing nation perspective of value and rights-based climate
action, saying that the focus on the language of climate change politics had distracted from the
need for actual action.
Despite CSE’s concerns, the Paris Agreement was signed and ratified by India and work
to implement the Agreement began. COP22 found CSE struggling to redefine its role in the
landscape of international climate change politics after the defeat of these basic principles and
policy proposals within the Paris Agreement. CSE’s ideological and equity-based rhetoric was
no longer useful to government delegates after the Paris Agreement entered into force, thus the
government offered no official space for CSE to advocate. No longer playing their central role in
Indian climate policy as in COP 21, CSE found themselves on the outside, not invited to speak or
participate in the Indian Pavilion space. This shift in participatory opportunity reflected the
shifting nature of the international climate regime and the changing needs of the Indian
government.
During COP 22, CSE held one Side Event: “Addressing Loss and Damage in Developing
Countries: Need for Global Agricultural Insurance Mechanism,” but was otherwise absent from
public spaces during the conference. Loss and damage is an emerging area of international
climate change policy that accounts for substantial material losses for the effects of climate
change. This initiative is especially favored by vulnerable developing countries and who seek
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financial compensation from developed states. CSE’s proposals, outlined in this discussion,
called for a new global insurance mechanism to address the issues of losses and damages for
agriculture workers, what they termed a program to more efficiently “operationalize equity” in
the UNFCCC post-Paris.14 CSE representatives noted that this policy area is underdeveloped but
represents the future of the movement for equity.15
After COP 22, CSE continues to attempt to design policy for the implementation of the
Paris Agreement. In a policy brief on the global stocktake mechanism of the Paris Agreement,
CSE provided a policy perspective and framework that government negotiators could adopt. The
global stocktake (GST) is an element of the Paris Agreement that reviews individual nation’s
contributions and seeks to increase global action, but was left unspecified in the Agreement and
throughout COP 22. In their brief, CSE argues, “Equity can be operationalized in the global
stocktake by increase in ambition of climate efforts of countries. Here, historical responsibility
and capability must be used as indicators to implement equity” (CSE 2017). With this policy
brief, CSE attempts to fill a gap left in the policy of the Paris Agreement and inject their equity
perspective into Indian policy.

The Energy and Research Institute (TERI)
The Energy and Research Institute (TERI) is a prominent Indian NGO that has engaged
in the issue of climate change since 1989, when it organized the “International Conference on
Global Warming and Climate Change: Perspectives from Developing Countries.” Founded in
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Interview with Geetika Singh and Rakesh Kamal Acharya Bhagavatula, CSE. 16 May 2016.
New Delhi, India.
15 Chandra Bushan, Director CSE, in conversation with the author. Marrakech, Morocco. 18
November 2016.
63

1974 as the Tata Energy Research Institute, a branch of the Tata Group, this organization is a
think tank dedicated to research on sustainable development in India. Renamed in 2003, TERI
has been at the forefront of policy discussions surrounding industry contributions to action on
climate change, using their deep ties to members of the business community and their expert
knowledge of the energy sector to inform policy.
TERI’s Earth Science and Climate Change division has been instrumental in charting the
effects of climate change in India, partnering with government research institutions, state and
local governments, international organizations, and other NGOs to gather data and knowledge on
climate change. They use this knowledge to develop policies and best practices that are feasible
in the Indian context. TERI has published many reports on the business implications of climate
change and international politics for Indian businesses. They combine the scientific and political
research of the organization with a consultation with various industry and corporate stakeholders,
outlining the effects of Indian climate policy on the business environment (Vancheswaran 2015)
and on specific sectors like wind energy (TERI 2016).
TERI also has a strong relationship with the Indian government and climate change
negotiators, offering independent analysis of climate change and energy related issues for
government policymakers.16 In 2010, the MOEFCC requested TERI review India’s
communications to the UNFCCC and the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) on the latest climate science. In this request, TERI “regularly participated and
provided inputs in the meetings of the Climate Change Core Groups [of the MOEFCC],” while
assisting the MOEFCC prepare for COP13 through COP15 (TERI 2010). TERI was able to give
recommendations and advice to facilitate Indian negotiators in the various aspects of climate
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negotiations, including the provision of background papers, summary reports of research, and
analysis of negotiating texts.
At COP21 in Paris, TERI participated in a number of forums, both in civil society space
and in government sanctioned space. They presented in the Indian Pavilion on greenhouse gas
management in many of India’s industrial and business sectors, offering their expertise and
research as a “knowledge partner” to the Indian government. TERI’s main messages during
COP21 were that proposed Indian contributions for mitigating and adapting to climate change in
its INDC were “ambitious” and coordination of various actors—government, civil society, and
industry—would be required to meet India’s climate goals.
TERI generally viewed the outcome of COP21 as a success for all those involved. Dr.
Ajay Mathur, Director-General of TERI, wrote favorably of the Paris Agreement, calling it a
“huge step forward” for all parties involved (Mathur 2016). He expressed confidence that India
and the rest of the developing world will be able to meet their development agendas and their
climate targets under the framework of the Paris Agreement, in part because of the collective
process that will mobilize countries’ “reputational interest” in increasing ambition (Mathur
2016). TERI has been very positive in the results of the PA and has viewed the new
circumstances of international climate change policy as an opportunity to be seized by Indian
actors, a clear indication of their “progressive internationalist” approach.
Following the signing of the Paris Agreement, TERI quickly turned to advocating for
implementation of India’s contributions. On March 14, 2016, TERI hosted a meeting amongst
Indian stakeholders on the implementation of the Paris Agreement, bringing together industry
representatives and government officials. The Special Secretary of the MOEFCC, Shri Susheel
Kumar, spoke on the necessity of collaboration in India, citing the importance of think tanks and
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civil society organizations, like TERI, to find solutions (TERI 2016a). At the World Sustainable
Development Summit organized by TERI, the Minister of Human Resource Development,
Prakash Javadekar (the leader of India’s delegation to COP21), said “TERI is important for us, as
a think tank. Under the leadership of Dr. Ajay Mathur, TERI can bring about this change” (TERI
2016b).
At COP22, TERI continued their high level of engagement throughout the Conference
and in negotiations. Their close relationship with the Indian government was clearly
demonstrated in the ten events in which they participated at the Indian Pavilion, as both panelist
and moderator. TERI director Ajay Mathur was a staple at the Indian Pavilion, engaging
amicably with government negotiators and other members of civil society.17 These events
demonstrated TERI’s broad range of specialization, covering topics of smart cities, renewable
energy, energy efficiency, and climate justice, but they focused primarily upon technological and
industry related knowledge pertinent to the Indian power and business sectors.
Mr. Mathur noted, in a press release on COP22, that the COP represented the importance
of linking multiple stakeholders to address climate change. “Action from negotiation tables now
has moved to factories and policy making rooms of governments,” Mathur said, “a big shift from
Paris” (TERI 2016c). In this vein, TERI research and publications increased their focus upon
Indian ability to transition its economy and develop using sustainable power.

Development Alternatives
Development Alternatives (DA) is an NGO working on sustainable development in India
who has adopted climate change as a cross cutting issue that effects social and economic
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development. DA conducts research on the best practices for environmental management and
economic growth and implements programs and systems designed to achieve these goals. In
climate change, DA is engaged in research and advocacy, but has unique capabilities to
implement programs in rural areas of India. Their mission is to “connect the local to the global”
said Dr. Shailendra Nath Pandey, a Senior Programme Director for DA.
DA’s focus has been primarily at the state and sub-state level, yet engages at the
international level as it relates to their domestic priorities. DA worked closely with the state of
Madha Pradesh to develop their State Action Plan on Climate Change and has reviewed national
policies through the lens of local implementation.18 Their work is particular to specific regions,
but all focus upon advancing sustainable development in rural areas, while highlighting the
technological, political, and financial challenges that exist. DA focuses less upon contesting
government policies or attempting to influence the broad framework of international climate
change, but rather are focused on the reality of implementing the mandates created in
negotiations.
DA, compared to other NGOs, is relatively new to the UNFCCC and their contributions
to the Conference have been limited. Their presence in civil society is less prominent than other
larger NGOs like CSE or TERI, but their engagement in COPs have been primarily to network
with other local NGOs on implementation methods and technologies.19 At COP22, Development
Alternatives moderated an event called: “Low Carbon Cement—Supporting Sustainable
Development of Emerging Economies,” where NGOs discussed the technological imperatives
for development through the specific industry discussions. These discussions, while not
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addressing the global political discussions taking place in Marrakech, are crucial to the
subsequent implementation of these political decisions.

All India Women’s Conference
The All India Women’s Conference (AIWC) is an advocacy group that lobbies for the
rights of women and for their augmented empowerment and role in Indian society. Founded in
1927, the AIWC has adopted climate change as an issue of their concern, recognizing the
intersection between gender and environmental concerns. Joining the COP process in 2013, the
AIWC is an active part of the Gender Constituency where they present their projects and
activities to the wider community and submit recommendations to the UNFCCC.
The AIWC has incorporated climate change into their work on women’s empowerment in
a number of ways, most publically through their series of workshops on the impacts of climate
change and the effects on women. Using their India-wide network to mobilize support across the
country, they held workshops in 2014 and 2015 that educated women on climate change and
made recommendations on local initiatives and national engagement.20 Their holistic focus
included personal actions and best practices for being good environmental stewards while also
advocating for national level policies and programs to address climate change. Key
recommendations from these workshops included the demand that climate politics and policy
must be inclusive and accountable to their women constituents. More recently, the AIWC has
organized workshops to present their report entitled: “Promoting Pro-Poor Low Carbon
Development Strategies in South Asia,” a document that outlines the direct effects of climate
policy on sustainable living in India (AIWC 2015).
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The AIWC has submitted a number of recommendations to the UNFCCC and the Indian
government calling for gender equality in climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts. They
consistently say in these communications that “gender balance” is a “key factor in the drive to
achieve climate justice” (AIWC 2013). While they recognize some of the progress made (like
India’s NAPCC, which highlights the impacts of climate change on women), they also not the
“lack of clearly spelt out policies or strategies with regard to women’s agency towards climate
change solutions” (AIWC 2013). This lack of policy regarding women’s role in climate action is
very evident in India’s INDC and has yet to be substantially addressed in Indian policy. The high
number of submissions directly to the UNFCCC demonstrate that the AIWC may feel that the
international space is more accepting of their recommendations than the Indian government.

Discussion
NGOs exert a moderate level of influence on Indian climate policy, especially with
regards to framing issues and setting agendas for climate action, but their influence is not
uniform between my cases nor over time. Using Betsill and Corell’s framework, preliminary
conclusions on the influence of NGOs on the negotiation process can be drawn. The indicators of
issue framing, agenda setting, and their influence on the positions of the Indian government
demonstrate the various levels of influence of the four NGOs identified in this study.
Prominent NGOs like CSE and TERI have the reputation and connections within the
Indian government delegation to influence policy positions and lobby for ideological mainstream
perspectives. TERI and CSE have been instrumental in providing research and knowledge to the
Indian government, data that supplements and independently corroborates the government’s own
research. The analysis and verification of government policies is conducted in formal
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consultations and informal communications, but allows for these organizations to critique
government policies in a constructive and collaborative way. While they may contest aspects of
government policy, CSE and TERI maintain reputation as serious, scientifically rigorous
organizations, which allow them to continue their relationship with the government.
An analysis of Development Alternatives and the All India Women’s Conference on the
other hand demonstrate the limited nature of their influence, in part because of the constraints of
the scope of their organizations. Development Alternatives’ focus on primarily rural
development places them outside of broad policy discussions and instead leaves them reacting to
the political decisions that are formulized independent of their own perspectives. The AIWC,
while advocating passionately for the inclusion of women and the importance of gender in
climate change solutions has yet to find a significant response or priority in government policy.
While their efforts to educate and lobby have prominently displayed the issue, AIWC has been
unable to solidify these concerns into actionable, substantive policy.
The transition from COP21 to COP22 also played a role in determining the level of NGO
influence. Where COP21 was focused upon creating a framework agreement for the governance
of climate change, COP22 focused almost solely on the implementation of the Paris Agreement.
COP21 provided opportunity for a wider range of NGOs to make their case to the government
and participate in the COP process because the guide for climate action had yet to be agreed
upon. With the Paris Agreement undecided, many organizations, especially CSE and the AIWC,
regarded COP21 as a crucial moment for influencing lasting change. By inserting their
perspectives and agendas into the text of the Paris Agreement, NGOs influence would be
crystalized in international law.
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COP22 provided a drastically different environment for NGOs to operate within, and
some organizations struggled to adjust. CSE, major proponents in equity based carbon budget
frameworks during COP21, had to completely refocus their efforts during COP22. The
government no longer in need of proposals for determining the framework of climate action,
CSE was left out of many of the discussion hosted by the government, whereas TERI, who
specializes in technological knowledge and industrial partnerships, was featured prominently in
the governments COP22 presentations. This demonstrates the importance of the wider
geopolitical context in determining possible NGO influence.
Indian NGOs have limited influence in policy formation, but perform a vital function in
the UNFCCC by supporting and advocating for Indian policy positions. The NGOs of India, in
this international space, all serve to demonstrate India’s capacity to transition to a clean economy
while defending the principles and perspectives of the Indian government. These activities exist
interdependently with the earlier described activities of NGOs (issue-framing, knowledge
provision, and lobbying), involving elements of all these actions, but with the common national
approach. NGOs construct understandings of topics, conduct studies, and advocate for policies,
but within the international sphere of the UNFCCC all of these activities are aimed at promoting
India’s position in the world, the ideological “climate nationalism” described by Fisher (2012).
Through their participation, NGOs project an image of India to demonstrate the nation’s
capability of transforming their economy and society towards climate action. Large NGOs, like
TERI, project the institutional and technical expertise needed to implement pro-climate programs
at a national scale. TERI’s numerous reports on the Indian energy mix, new and renewable
energy sources, and climate finance all serve to indicate India’s seriousness in proposals to the
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UNFCCC and other international organizations. These contributions deflect the criticisms of
developed countries who see India lagging in their ambition and action.
Even smaller NGOs participating in the UNFCCC, like DA and AIWC, contribute to this
image of a proactive and capable India. Their presence in civil society spaces, while not directly
promoted by the Indian government, adds a sheen of legitimacy to Indian proposals by
representing a diversity of perspectives and a varied level of the scope of their work. DA’s work
with state and local governments in India presents the commitments made by multiple actors
within Indian society and the actual implementation and follow through of international and
national policy. AIWC’s grassroots work with women’s organizations across the country signal
similar participation and India’s commitment to just climate action.
NGOs not only demonstrate India’s capabilities, but also are some of the strongest
advocates for the principles of the Indian government. Here, NGOs can and have had significant
influence in shaping the very principles argued by the government and work continually to
campaign for their adoption in international agreements. CSE was one of the foremost
proponents of justice and equity in international climate change policy and provided the
methodological basis for operating these principles. Their work to frame the climate change from
a developing country perspective and develop a framework of re-calculating global carbon
emissions from a per capita basis significantly altered the approach of the Indian government and
shifted the wider narrative in climate change negotiations.
This contribution was at the origin of the UNFCCC, but CSE continues this work in its
many iterations today, advocating for the application of India’s principles in programs of loss
and damages, climate adaptation, and the global stocktake. At events both in the Indian pavilion
and in civil society spaces, CSE is a staunch advocate for equity-based policy. They also serve as
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a primary organization to condemn and shame the lack of action by developed nations, who they
feel have failed in their obligations and responsibilities to the world. The Indian government,
constrained by diplomatic decorum, cannot be as direct and blunt in this regard as independent
organizations like CSE, and thus are happy to promote and provide spaces for CSE to promote
reports like “Captain America,” which calls out American “hypocrisy” in climate negotiations.
Other Indian organizations at times adopt these perspectives and join in the chorus of developing
nations calling for a principled approach that demands greater action by the developed world.
As NGOs fulfill these roles, advocating for India’s image and policy perspectives, one
must consider the question of coordination between government actors and the independent
organizations. NGOs have little influence in the official policy formation process, but the
conclusions drawn from government analysis and independent research tend to coincide and
come to similar interpretations of India’s geopolitical situation. Organizations and government
representatives may disagree to the exact policy solutions or the degree in which principles and
concepts are implemented, depending upon their organizational situation and ideology, but their
basic, original premises largely are consistent. While there is little evidence of direct collusion
between these two camps in forming larger international policy, a strategic arrangement is
apparent between NGOs and government negotiators.
The Indian government uses NGOs as a tool to further its own objectives in the
UNFCCC. NGOs are happily complicit in this arrangement, as they enjoy the prominence of the
stage of international negotiations and the opportunity and resources to work within government
structures, and the Indian government enjoys the legitimacy and technical contributions of the
NGOs. The case of CSE indicates the government’s willingness to use NGOs as convenient to
their own priorities. CSE’s work in equity and climate justice was indispensable during the era of
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Indian policy that refused concrete contributions by developing countries while demanding
greater contributions by the developed world and provided the government with the moral
arguments and methodological calculations necessary to maintain their own positions. But when
the paradigm of international climate negotiations shifted, beginning with COP15 in Copenhagen
and finalized in the Paris Agreement, the government no longer needed or as highly valued the
contributions of CSE, evident in the lack of invitation to participate in the Indian pavilion space
during COP22. The shift away from CSE and towards the technical expertise of TERI indicates
the government's use of NGOs to fit their policy priorities to the wider international context of
negotiations.

Counterfactuals
Betsill and Corell’s design requires an analysis of the hypothetical scenario where NGO
participation did not occur in order to strengthen claims of their influence. Counterfactuals can
“uncovered instances where NGOs were not influential despite a correlation between NGO
activities and the observed effect” (Betsill 2008, 179), further strengthening claims of influence.
Newell (2000, 34, 124) also notes the necessity of counterfactuals, saying that the
“counterfactual argument about whether the outcomes could be expected in the absence of NGO
campaigning” can establish a clearer conclusion on the causal relationship between NGOs and
policy outcomes.
Without NGO participation, Indian climate policy would be without check and their
technological and research capabilities would be severely limited. NGOs provide crucial analysis
and recommendations to the government that ensure that Indian climate policy is coherent, in
India’s best interest, and is feasible. Research and data produced by NGOs ensures that the
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government policies are crafted using the most scientifically accurate and up-to-date information.
While the government has some capability with its own research facilities and departments,
independent review also lends legitimacy to official government documents.
Additionally, NGOs play a crucial role in advocating for the positions of the Indian
government. They especially provide a moral or ethical claim for Indian proposals and
demonstrate the local support for initiatives. Their research and writing create a climate that
supports Indian claims in the international community for climate justice, the principles of
common but differentiated responsibility, and historical responsibility. Without the voice of civil
society echoing the claims of the government and providing hard evidence for them, the Indian
negotiators would be isolated and would not be taken seriously in the international community.

Conclusions
Indian NGOs do have an influence upon Indian climate policy, but that influence is
constrained by the ideological perspective and technical capacity of the organizations, the
institutional level of engagement and focus (international/national/subnational), and the phase
and environment of international negotiations. The case study of Indian NGOs demonstrates that
NGO influence is closely related to the production of knowledge and the organizations ability to
supplement and analyze government policy. The relation between Indian NGOs and the Indian
government is one of cooperation in international spaces like the UNFCCC, if the organization
can provide substantial resources and support for government perspectives. Even if these
prominent NGOs disagree with government positions, they withhold their disagreements when
representing India; a phenomena that supports Fisher’s claims of “climate nationalism” among
NGOs (Fisher 2012).
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However, further study of the negotiating positions of the Indian government is needed to
determine the deeper level of NGO influence upon the negotiated outcome of international
environmental negotiations. The scope of this study recognizes the most prominent of Indian
NGOs, but does not extend to local grassroots initiatives or larger transnational actors. How do
smaller NGOs that vehemently disagree with Indian policy engage in Indian society? Are
transnational NGOs more willing to confront the Indian government than domestic NGOs?
While too broad for this study, a wider survey of all the actors in Indian climate policy would
give a more complex, but informative look at the mechanisms of the Indian policy process.
We can conclude that Indian NGOs do influence Indian climate policy to a moderate
degree, and by transitive property, we can make a weaker claim that they do have some influence
in the wider international political space of the UNFCCC. Their influence on the policies of the
Indian government with regards to the UNFCCC, especially through their provision of
knowledge and construction of policy recommendations, offers NGOs a channel to influence the
UNFCCC itself. The difficulties of directly determining this influence remains, but through this
analysis of a few prominent Indian NGOs, we can begin to see the complex relation between
state and NGO, and NGO and international community.
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